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A diverse body of laws and regulations speaking to reproductive
rights, healthcare, criminalpunishment of drug use, termination of
parental rights, and more creates the rules of maternity. These rules

are guidance provided both obliquely and explicitly by the law's
coercive power telling women both how to and who should mother.
Rule 1 begins in pregnancy, with the message that "your body is your
child's vessel." Duringpregnancy, women are counselled that doctor
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knows best. After the child's birth, the mother remains responsiblefor
the people who enter a child's life, leading to rule 3: "mothers must
always protect." Rule 4 provides examples of the tightropes that
mothers must walk: be nurturing, but not too nurturing; breastfeed,
but not for too long; be protective, but not overprotective. "Good
motherhood is a narrow road." Finally, the rules create an
aspirational maternity, specifying that "only some women need
apply" for motherhood. Becoming a mother means accepting
responsibility for another person but need not remove autonomy
entirely. The rules of maternity must be rewritten, from borders
limiting the choices of individual mothers to principles respecting
their autonomy.
INTRODUCTION

Motherhood is all about judgment. Sometimes the judgment is
external and positive, as motherhood is a respected status that is
customarily rewarded with praise.' Sometimes the judgment is
internal and empowered, as mothers themselves exercise judgment
as to when to become a mother, how to become a mother, where to
give birth, what parenting philosophy to follow (if any), and what
kind of parent to be.
External judgment of mothers, however, can also be negative.
The Centers for Disease Control (CDC), for example, recently issued
an infographic advising all women that if there was a risk that they
"could get pregnant," they should abstain from alcohol entirely lest
they become pregnant accidentally and harm the fetus. 2 Examples
abound of pregnant women and mothers facing social judgment for
their parenting decisions: ordering wine or a caffeinated beverage
while visibly pregnant,3 carrying an infant in a sling,4 or buying
children a Happy Meal at McDonald's.5

1. See April L. Cherry, Nurturing in the Service of White Culture: Racial
Subordination, Gestational Surrogacy, and the Ideology of Motherhood, 10 TEX. J.
WOMEN & L. 83, 103-06 (2001) (comparing positive perceptions of married mothers
with negative views of unmarried mothers).
2. Alcohol and Pregnancy, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/vitalsigns/fasdlindex.html (last accessed Jan. 18, 2017).
3. See Kim H. Pearson, Chemical Kids, 24 TEX. J. WOMEN GENDER & L. 67, 92
(2014).
4. See Chris Gottlieb, Reflections on Judging Mothering, 39 U. BALT. L. REV.
371, 371 (2010).
5. See Cynthia Godsoe, Parsing Parenthood, 17 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 113,
139 (2013).
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Individual interactions with strangers are undoubtedly
annoying, 6 but can largely be dismissed and ignored. Mothers
operate within an often invisible framework of legal regulation,
however, that they ignore at their peril. Both social and legal
assessments of motherhood arise from perceptions of ideal parenting
and create a particularly pernicious type of regulatory power: "non7
authoritarian, non-conspiratorial, and . . . non-orchestrated." This
article uncovers how the non-orchestrated legal regulation of
mothers has molded a specific and narrow vision of what and who
mothers should be.8 Some of the regulation merely encourages
choices that legislatures or judges believe to be best. Much of it
punishes the "wrong" choices. The effect of such regulation is
twofold: as a direct effect, it hems in acceptable motherhood tighter
and tighter. The implicit message is broader, and fundamentally
undermines the autonomy of mothers.
A particularly disturbing aspect of the legal regulation of
motherhood is that it seems to operate piecemeal, focusing on one
specific problematic action at a time or working within a single area
of law. Moreover, such piecemeal regulations operate underneath a
cultural veneer of celebration of motherhood and maternity, making
the negative and even punitive regulations even harder to see. The
individual limitations may appear unobjectionable when considered
one by one, motivated by concern for children's wellbeing and only
affecting so-called "bad" mothers. Good mothers, and people who
support good mothering, need not look deeper at such limitations, as
the regulations should not affect them.
It is critically important, however, to canvass such limitations on
maternal choice in order to reveal that although the law's regulation
of motherhood has not consciously been built up with the desire to

6. In the age of social media, however, there is always the risk that such
encounters draw wider attention. See, e.g., Rebecca Schuman, I Am Terrified of
2015),
25,
(July
SLATE.COM
Child Literally Anywhere,
Taking My
http://www.slate.com/articles/1ife/family/2015/07/crying-toddlerin maine diner im
_afraid_my_parenting-could-go-viraltoo.html ("In three weeks, my daughter and I
will make our first journey on an airplane. I already want to die. I'm not afraid of the
judgmental stares or grumbling I am sure to get. What I'm afraid of is that my
inevitable display of poor parenting will end up online forever-subject to ignominy,
incessant debate, and posterity.").
7. SUSAN BORDO, UNBEARABLE WEIGHT 26 (1993).
8. Fathers also face legal and social policing of their parenthood, but in a way
markedly different, as will be discussed further below, than regulation of maternity.
See Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Making Mommies: Law, Pre-Implantation Genetic
Diagnosis, and the Complicationsof Pre-Motherhood, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 313,
334-35 (2008).
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oppress women, the cumulative effect of the law is oppressive
nonetheless. 9 Such restrictions undermine women's autonomy
throughout their lives, but particularly at the moment that women
become responsible for another life. The cumulative weight of legal
limitations placed upon mothers violate their agency, autonomy, and
dignity.10
This article chronicles the rules of maternity; the guidance
provided both obliquely and explicitly by the law's coercive power to
tell women how to mother and who can mother. The rules are not
entirely discrete; at times they overlap and can regulate the same
behavior simultaneously. By beginning to parse the overall structure
of the law's regulation of maternity, however, the scale of control
becomes apparent.
The article first provides a theoretical grounding as to the
autonomy of mothers. Autonomy is often viewed as entirely
individualistic, which has been a source of criticism by feminist legal
scholars
and potentially conflicts with the fundamentally
nonindividualistic
responsibilities
inherent
in
motherhood.
Principles drawn from relational autonomy and agency theory point
towards a middle
ground, respecting mothers' individual
decisionmaking within relatively broad limits. Such an approach not
only benefits mothers and children, but also has been implicitly
supported by the Supreme Court in the context of the constitutional
rights of parenthood."
The article then moves to the specific rules of maternity. The
first rule begins in pregnancy, with the message that "your body is
your child's vessel." Every choice that a pregnant woman makes
becomes a source of potential harm to her child, and thus of
potential punishment through both civil and criminal law. The
second rule explains one way women should attempt to avoid such
liability, by following the maxim that "doctor knows best." To
question medical authority or have preferences other than following
doctor's orders is to needlessly risk the health of a pregnancy or a
child, and is evidence of bad mothering. After the child's birth, the
mother remains responsible for the people who enter a child's life,
leading to the third rule: "mothers must always protect." Rule four
provides examples of the tightropes that mothers must walk: be

9. See Robin West, Jurisprudenceand Gender, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 47 (1988).
10. See Maxine Eichner, Families, Human Dignity, and State Support for
Caretaking: Why the United States'Failureto Ameliorate the Work-Family Conflict is
a Derelictionof the Government's Basic Responsibilities, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1593, 1617
(2010).
11. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
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nurturing, but not too nurturing; breastfeed, but not for too long; be
protective, but not overprotective. "Good motherhood is a narrow
road." Finally, the rules of maternity create an aspirational
maternity, one that excludes women deemed undesirable as mothers
because of class, race, past actions, and so on. The fifth rule specifies
that "only some women need apply" for motherhood; women who
have already been judged as bad mothers should not be legally
permitted to reproduce.
Having canvassed existing regulations of mothers, the conclusion
returns to the lessons from agency and relational autonomy in order
to point towards needed reforms. The rules of maternity must be
fundamentally changed from borders limiting the choices of
individual mothers to principles respecting those mothers'
autonomy.
I. AUTONOMY WITHIN MOTHERHOOD
Although the choices of all parents can be second-guessed, and
the behavior of both mothers and fathers is often criticized, mothers
face particularly searching scrutiny. This begins in pregnancy, first
in the doctor's office when pregnant women enter what Kathryn
Morgan aptly called "legitimate range for medical surveillance."12
The scrutiny then widens, as a pregnancy becomes clearly visible
and members of the public are immediately alerted to the woman's
status as they observe her behavior.1 3 Fathers-to-be (and
nonpregnant mothers-to-be) obviously lack the immediate visual
clue to their impending parentage. As will be discussed below,
fathers can engage in behavior that risks the health of the fetus or
eventual child just as pregnant women can, yet their behavior is not
scrutinized in the same way. 14 Once a child is born, the mother's
choices such as the food she eats no longer impact her child in the
same way, yet social expectations regarding mothers as primary
caregivers extend the heightened surveillance of her behavior as a
parent. As the rules of maternity demonstrate, moreover, legal

12. Kathryn Pauly Morgan, Contested Bodies, Contested Knowledges: Women,
Health, and the Politics of Medicalization, in THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S HEALTH 83,
93 (1998) (emphasis omitted).
13. Id. at 94-95.

14. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive Choices and Informed Consent:
Fetal Interests, Women's Identity, and RelationalAutonomy, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 567,

590 (2011).
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regulation focuses on her behavior rather than impacts of a father's
parenting.15
The rules of maternity operate upon women at two levels. The
first is the direct regulation of women's behavior; restricting their
choices through prohibitions or coercion and punishing them for
making the wrong decision. The second level is more insidious: by
limiting mothers' choices so clearly and across so many types of
decisions, the rules express distrust in mothers' capacity. The
implication of such regulation is that mothers cannot be trusted to
make responsible decisions concerning the upbringing of their own
children. Mothers cannot be trusted with autonomy.
Autonomy can be defined many ways, but a shorthand rule of
thumb is "self-determination."16 Leigh Goodmark summarized,
"autonomy is constituted of the independence to deliberate and make
choices free from manipulation by others and the capacity to make
reasoned decisions about how to live one's life."'7 Goodmark's focus
on living one's life introduces a common reason why some feminist
scholars have criticized the concept of autonomy as excessively
individualistic.' 8 If autonomy is defined as making choices driven by
individual preferences, familial and social relationships with other
people can be jettisoned as irrelevant to autonomous action.' 9 Faith
in the power of individual decisionmaking implicitly denies that
political and social pressure help to form what people view as their
own preferences. 20 Such a focus on individualism also arguably
genders autonomy as male, as described by Marilyn Friedman:
Besides connecting autonomy to reason, popular Western
culture has also associated autonomy with other masculine-

15. Indeed, as Nancy Dowd has notably argued, the legal regulation of fathers
operates to push them away from hands-on caregiving parental roles entirely, rather
than specify appropriate caregiving practices. See Nancy E. Dowd, Rethinking
Fatherhood, 48 FLA. L. REv. 523, 526-30 (1996); see also Nancy E. Dowd, Sperm,
Testosterone, Masculinities and Fatherhood, 13 NEV. L.J. 438, 455 (2013); Nancy E.
Dowd, Fatherhoodand Equality: ReconfiguringMasculinities, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
1047 (2012).
16. MARILYN FRIEDMAN, AUTONOMY, GENDER, POLITICS 4 (2003); Catriona
Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar, Introduction: Autonomy Refigured, in RELATIONAL
AUTONOMY 3, 5 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000).
17. Leigh Goodmark, Autonomy Feminism: An Anti-Essentialist Critique of
Mandatory Interventions in Domestic Violence Cases, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 22
(2009).
18. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 81.
19. See id.
20. Mackenzie & Stoljar, supra note 16, at 10-11.
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and
independence
example,
for
traits,
defined
outspokenness. Traits popularly regarded as feminine, by
contrast, have no distinctive connection to autonomy-social
for example. Thus popular gender
interactiveness,
stereotypes have associated autonomy with men but not
with women; these stereotypes might invidiously infect
philosophical thinking about autonomy. 21
To the extent that autonomy focuses on free individual choices,
there is an obvious dissonance with mothering (and parenting more
generally). 22 Although parents-or more specifically, fathers-have
historically had considerable freedom to make decisions controlling
their children, significantly greater constraints are imposed today. 23
Children are themselves rights-holders, and the state has an
interest in protecting both children and future children during
pregnancy. 24
Recognizing that a strict sense of autonomy may conflict with the
interdependent obligations of motherhood, 25 several approaches
enrich autonomy by acknowledging the realities of personal and
familial obligation. One option is to focus on the procedure of
ideal of "substantive
any
than
rather
decisionmaking
independence." 26 Procedural autonomy asks whether "the process of
formation of the preference or decision has satisfied certain
standards of critical reflection. Once a preference or decision has
passed such formal or procedural tests, it is autonomous, no matter
what its content." 27 Thus, even a mother's choice to sublimate all of
her individual preferences in favor of serving a child's best interests

21. Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, Social Disruption, and Women, in
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY, supra note 16, at 38-39; see also Katharine T. Bartlett,
Feminist Legal Scholarship: A History Through the Lens of the California Law
Review, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 381, 398-99 (2012).
22. For example, Jody Madeira has highlighted the inconsistent treatment of
women's decisionmaking autonomy in the context of reproduction, comparing what
she terms "emotional paternalism" as applied against women seeking abortions and
women seeking fertility treatments. See Jody Lyne6 Madeira, Woman Scorned?:
Resurrecting Infertile Women's Decision-Making Autonomy, 71 MD. L. REV. 339, 408
(2012).
23. See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, The Case Against Separating the Care from the
Caregiver: Reuniting Caregivers'Rights and Children's Rights, 15 NEV. L.J. 236,
246-47 (2014).
24. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 14, at 570.
25. Cf. GRACE CLEMENT, CARE, AUTONOMY, AND JUSTICE 35 (1996).
26. Natalie Stoljar, Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition, in RELATIONAL
AUTONOMY, supra note 16, at 94.

27.

Id.
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could be viewed as autonomous as long as she consciously decided to
do so. Natalie Stoljar questions such an account of autonomy as
drawing the skepticism of "the feminist intuition, which claims that
preferences influenced by oppressive norms of femininity cannot be
autonomous." 28 Such feminist intuition would be similarly suspicious
of procedural autonomy operating within the rules of maternity.
Legal regulation of motherhood embodies an oppressive norm of
acceptable maternal behavior, constraining free choice well past the
point that procedural autonomy within its limits is true autonomy.
A second complication to traditional masculine autonomy holds
more promise. Relational autonomy aims to reconcile individualistic
self-determination with expectations and pressures of social
networks. 29 The individual cannot be defined or understood without
acknowledging the impact of "relationships with doctors, family,
fetus, friends, community, and society at large." 30 This means that
relational autonomy exists in a "gray area[] between full
individualistic autonomy and complete coercion." 31 Pamela LauferUkeles describes how such an approach acknowledges the confluence
of individual preferences alongside potential coercion:
Expecting and potential mothers may consent to medical
procedures because of their strong interests in having
children, because of their trust in doctors, or because they
want to do everything they can to preserve the health and
viability of their expected or future children. . . . Similar

pressures apply to women who want to choose an abortion,
want to choose a birthing method not recommended by a
doctor, or want to refuse a screening procedure advanced by
their doctor. Although women may resist this pressure, this
dynamic may create a consensual choice that in reality is not
welcome, but rather is fraught with doubt and concern. It
can be difficult for women to find their own voices when a
third party is heavily channeling the interests of the fetus or

28.
29.

Id. at 95 (emphasis omitted).
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Mothering for Money: Regulating Commercial

Intimacy, 88 IND. L.J. 1223, 1249 (2013); see also Jody Lyne6 Madeira, Aborted
Emotions: Regret, Relationality, and Regulation, 21 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 13
(2014); Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and
Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989).
30. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 14, at 610; see also Marilyn Friedman, Relational
Autonomy and Individuality, 63 U. TORONTO L.J. 327, 328 (2013).
31. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 29, at 1249-50.
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the state. The environment in which women make these
choices must be taken into account. 32
Classical analysis of autonomy might conclude that it is simply
impossible to promote autonomous decisionmaking in the context of
pregnancy and parenthood. Legal protections for the fetus or child,
in such a view, forestall a mother's autonomy entirely. Relational
autonomy recognizes the coercive pressure present as women
become mothers, preventing the classical liberal definition of
autonomy from operating, but asks how to best promote individual
decisionmaking in the midst of legal and social pressures. 3 3 Both
procedural and relational autonomy recognize these pressures, but
where procedural autonomy recognizes the power (even if limited) of
an individual mother, relational autonomy strives to balance
respecting subjective preferences and working to counteract the
external pressures affecting those preferences. Even in the context of
mothering and parenting, therefore, some amount of autonomy is
both possible and beneficial. 34 Mothers do not cease to be individuals
with the desire to express their preferences.3 5 Recognizing such
preferences respects the decisionmaking capacity of mothers, a
respect that has been historically denied to women and other
marginalized groups. 36
In order to balance the autonomy and interdependence of
mothers, the law should utilize a model of relational autonomy that
might also be termed agency. Agency means that an individual is
free to exercise "reasonable choice," even if the choice is from a
limited set of possible options. 37 The state remains free, therefore, to
specify borders to parental authority, such as prohibiting actions
that rise to the level of abuse or neglect.3 8 Within such boundaries,
however, a mother should be free to make decisions relating to her

32.
33.
34.
L.J. 733,

Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 14, at 613.
See Nedelsky, supra note 29, at 7.
See Margaret F. Brinig, Troxel and the Limits of Community, 32 RUTGERS
757 (2001).

35. See Katharine K. Baker, Property Rules Meet Feminist Needs: Respecting
Autonomy by Valuing Connection, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1523, 1527 (1998) ("[The law
freely interferes with the vertical relationship between a parent and child. This
interference often quashes a woman's potential to assert herself as an individual.").
36. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 73.

37.

Susan Sherwin, A RelationalApproach to Autonomy in Health Care, in THE

POLITICS OF WOMEN'S HEALTH, supra note 12, at 19, 32; see also Kathryn Abrams,

From Autonomy to Agency: Feminist Perspectives on Self-Direction, 40 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 805, 823-24 (1999).
38. See Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 24, at 572.
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pregnancy or parenting free from coercion and manipulation. 39 The
law should not simply permit but affirmatively promote her free
decisionmaking. 40
Such a perspective has been underscored by the Supreme Court.
In Troxel v. Granville, the Court held that a Washington statute that
allowed '"[a]ny person"' to request visitation rights with a child, to be
granted "when visitation may serve the best interest of the child,"
violated the constitutional rights of Washington parents. 4 1 Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court, reasoned that the statute "directly
contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act in
the best interest of his or her child." 4 2 The Court held that this
violated the respondent mother's fundamental constitutional rights
as a parent and that courts should give "at least some special
weight" to the decisions of a fit mother regarding the upbringing of
her child.43
Furthermore, the Court has more recently acknowledged a close
interaction between principles of liberty and equality. Justice
Kennedy wrote in Obergefell v. Hodges, "Rights implicit in liberty
and rights secured by equal protection may ... in some instances ...
be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other." 44 This
interaction is crucial to understanding the harm of the rules of
maternity. They operate as a limitation upon the free choices of
women, constraining their autonomy in deciding how to parent. The
cumulative effect, however, is to undermine the role of women in
broader society. Women have long faced formal and informal
barriers to entering the workplace, as well as Joan Williams's
"maternal wall" if they attempt to be both an employee outside the
home and a caregiver inside of it.45 The rules of maternity then tell
women that their judgment cannot be trusted inside the home
either. Distrust of women's decisionmaking in all spheres of their
lives weakens their equality alongside their autonomy. Justice

39. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 14.
40. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 29, at 1250.
41. 530 U.S. 57, 61 (2000) (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 26.10.160(3) (1994)); see
also Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of ParentalRights: Labor, Intent, and Fathers, 41
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 645, 649-50 (2014).
42. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69.
43. Id. at 70.
44. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015).
45. See Joan C. Williams & Elizabeth S. Westfall, Deconstructingthe Maternal
Wall: Strategies for Vindicating the Civil Rights of "Carers"in the Workplace, 13
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 31 (2006); Joan C. Williams, Beyond the Glass Ceiling:
The Maternal Wall As A Barrier to Gender Equality, 26 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1
(2003).
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Kennedy wrote that the interrelation of liberty and equality
46
"furthers our understanding of what freedom is and must become"
in the context of the right to marry. That same interrelation furthers
our understanding in the context of motherhood.
This principle of deferring to a mother's autonomy was
articulated in the context of a constitutional challenge but can easily
be applied by legislatures voting on new regulations of mothers'
choices and courts deciding whether existing statutes should be
applied more broadly. Absent allegations that a mother is unfit, she
should be free to make parenting decisions within relatively broad
boundaries, even if a lawmaker or judge or bystander would do
things differently themselves. 47
Many bystanders, judges, lawmakers, and even readers may
believe.that Troxel's respect for relational autonomy and agency by
mothers exists today and that current regulation simply outlines the
borders of fit parenthood. The next section begins analysis of the
rules of maternity and will show that today's rules constrict modem
motherhood into an impossibly narrow sphere.

II. RULE 1: YOUR BODY IS YOUR CHILD'S VESSEL
As soon as pregnancy begins, the pregnant woman is viewed as a
mother. 48 Obviously she is not yet a mother in the literal sense of the
word, and does not have legal rights as a mother to an identifiable
child, but society in many ways sees mothers-to-be as mothers in all
but the technical sense. 49 Women themselves often begin to identify
as mothers during pregnancy, but the label is applied
indiscriminately. For example, Justice Kennedy famously described
a woman who made the decision not to become a mother by
terminating her pregnancy as a mother, perhaps the clearest
50
example of a woman who would not describe herself with the term.

46. Id.
47. See the Conclusion at 87 for discussion of what those "broad boundaries" to
parental choice should be.
48. See Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of
Life, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 753, 812 (2006) ("But motherhood takes on added meaning
in the culture of life.. . . Its foundational precept-that life begins at conceptionextends maternal obligation backwards in time to include pregnancy at any stage.").
49. Of course, a mother-to-be is seen as a mother only if she herself is pregnant.
Nonpregnant prospective mothers, such as women whose female spouse or partner
carries the pregnancy or women who utilize surrogates to bring the pregnancy to
term, are treated as more akin to fathers-to-be: involved, but not committed entirely
yet.
50. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) ("It is self-evident that a
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Some of this recognition of pregnant women as already mothers
is not problematic. Many expectant women welcome the name of
their new role. A pregnant woman is perceived to already be bonding
with the fetus, to be vested with the mothers' instincts and
intuitions that will allow her to easily assume her caregiving role,
and to be the protective "mama bear." 51
Much of the attention given to a pregnant woman, however, is
negative. Pregnant women are the subject of constant attention and
criticism if they engage in any activities that might jeopardize their
future child. Eating sushi, 52 drinking coffee,5 3 lifting heavy packages,
exercising, 54 cleaning cat litter boxes,55 drinking alcohol,56 and any
number of other potentially hazardous activities justify passers-by in
intervening and instructing the pregnant woman in what she should
do differently.
It is not just society, however, that views the pregnant woman's
role to have shifted. The law also places heightened expectations and
regulations on her behavior based upon the expectation that from
the moment that pregnancy begins, her primary concern is for the
wellbeing of the fetus. Her body no longer belongs to her: it is a
vessel for her future child.
Such expectations are manifested in the law in two ways. First, a
woman who takes actions that might harm her future child must be
punished for acting contrary to her protective maternal role. Thus,
women who engage in risky behavior have committed a blameworthy
and sanctionable act that should be punished as actually harming
the child she "should" be acting to protect. Second, when a woman is

mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must struggle with grief. . . .").
51. Naomi Mezey & Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Against the New Maternalism, 18
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 229, 252 (2012) (quoting Hanna Rosin, Is the Tea Party a
Feminist
Movement?,
SLATE
(May
12,
2010,
12:03
PM),
http://www.slate.com/id/2253645.
52. See, e.g., Sydney Lupkin, Sorry, Pregnant Women, You Still Can't Eat
Sushi, ABCNEwS.COM (Jan. 23, 2015), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/pregnantwomen-study-carte-blanche-eat-sushilstory?id=28433617.
53. See, e.g., Lyz Lenz, Your Pregnancy or Theirs? How Advice Can Heighten
Pregnancy Stress, BABBLE.COM, http://www.babble.com/pregnancy/body-pregnancystress-anxiety-advice-moms-to-be/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2017).
54. See, e.g., Tracie Snowder, Pregnant Woman Under Fire for Rigorous
Workout Routine, KSL.COM (Oct. 10, 2013), http://www.ksl.com/.sid=27198127.
55. See, e.g., Diane Taylor, The Pregnancy Police Are Watching You, THE
GUARDIAN
(Sept. 4, 2006),
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2006/sep/04/
health.medicine andhealthl.
56. See, e.g., Julia Moskin, The Weighty Responsibility of Drinking for Two,
N.Y. TIMES.COM (Nov. 29, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/29/dining
/29preg.html ?n=-Top%2FNews%2FScience%2FTopics%2FChemicals.
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in the process of making a decision that does not properly
subordinate her own interests to the interest of her future child, the
state is asked to step in and assert control over the fetus in order to
protect it, even when that necessarily means that the state is also
asserting control over the pregnant woman.5 7
A. Drug Use DuringPregnancy
One of the most dramatic examples of the consequences faced by
pregnant women is drug use during pregnancy. A relatively small
minority of pregnant women use illegal drugs, 58 and Linda Fentiman
has argued that criminal prosecutions of such women have become
"markedly more aggressive" in recent years.5 9 Pregnant women have
faced both criminal prosecution and civil actions alleging abuse or
neglect based upon their use of drugs while pregnant. Such charges
are controversial, yet prosecutors continue to file them.
A notorious example took place in 2003, when a woman named
Regina McKnight was convicted in South Carolina of homicide by
60
child abuse due to her use of crack cocaine while pregnant. Rennie
Gibbs, sixteen years old at the time, was indicted in 2006 for
depraved heart murder on the theory that her cocaine use while
pregnant caused her stillbirth at 36 weeks.6 1 Several medical experts
who reviewed Gibbs's files, however, noted that the presence of
cocaine was so low as to not show up at all in the stillborn baby's
blood and that a more likely cause of the stillbirth was that the

57. In some circumstances, obviously, the state's interest in fetal protection
might work to protect the pregnant woman, such as if an employer was required to
accommodate a pregnant employee's temporary differential employment capabilities.
See generally Deborah Dinner, Strange Bedfellows at Work: Neomaternalism in the
Making of Sex DiscriminationLaw, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 453 (2014). Such regulation
arguably affects the pregnant woman's decisions in a way that affects her relational
autonomy but falls outside the scope of this article.
58. See Linda C. Fentiman, Pursuing the Perfect Mother: Why America's
Criminalization of Maternal Substance Abuse Is Not the Answer-A Comparative
Legal Analysis, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 389, 395 (2009).
59. Id. at 392.
60. State v. McKnight, 576 S.E.2d 168, 171 (S.C. 2003); see also Shalini
Bhargava, Note, Challenging Punishment and Privatization: A Response to the
Conviction of Regina McKnight, 39 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 513, 513-14 (2004); Dana
Page, Note, The Homicide by Child Abuse Conviction of Regina McKnight, 46 HOW.
L.J. 363, 365-69 (2003);
61. Seema Mohapatra, Unshackling Addiction: A Public Health Approach to
Drug Use During Pregnancy, 26 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC'Y 241, 242 (2011).; see also
Michele Goodwin, Fetal Protection Laws: Moral Panic and the New Constitutional
Battlefront, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 781, 808-12 (2014).
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umbilical cord was wrapped around the baby's neck. 62 After a judge
eventually dismissed the charges in 2014, the prosecutor initially
indicated that he would re-charge Gibbs with manslaughter. 63
Drug use during pregnancy is often discovered at birth, meaning
a newborn baby tests positive for an illegal drug (known as "positive
toxicology"). Beginning in the 1970s, a few states attempted to apply
standard laws against child abuse to such women, even though the
actions in question took place before the child's birth. For example,
in 1977 a woman in California was indicted for felony child
endangerment after giving birth to twins who tested positive for
heroin.64 The California court of appeals, however, held that the
child endangerment law did not apply to fetuses and thus could not
be applied to drug use during pregnancy.65 Such logic became
widespread as courts generally refused to apply general statutes
prohibiting child abuse or neglect to fetuses in utero.66
This did not prevent, however, more creative applications of
other child protection statutes. For example, multiple prosecutors
have interpreted statutes criminalizing giving drugs to a minor very
literally to refer to the umbilical cord, although judges have been
more skeptical of such reasoning. In 1991, a Florida woman gave
birth to a baby with positive toxicology and was charged with
delivering drugs to her child on the theory that in the moments after
the child's birth before the umbilical cord was cut, the mother
transferred the drugs in her own bloodstream to her child.67 Florida's
supreme court rejected such application of the statute.68 The
following year the Georgia court of appeals similarly reasoned that
drug delivery statutes prohibit transferring drugs outside of the
bodies of the two people in question and rejected prosecution of a

62. Jessica Mason Pieklo, Murder Charges Dismissed in Mississippi Stillbirth
Case, REWIRE.COM (Apr. 4, 2014), https://rewire.news/article/2014/04/04/murdercharges-dismissed-mississippi-stillbirth-case/.
63. Sarah Fowler, Judge Dismisses Rennie Gibbs'DepravedHeart Murder Case,
THE
DISPATCH
(Apr.
3,
2014),
http://www.cdispatch.com/news/article.asp
?aid=32344#.Uz2kxLX13zO.face-book.
64. Reyes v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 214 (1977).

65.

Id. at 219.

66. See Krista Stone-Manista, Protecting Pregnant Women: A Guide to
Successfully Challenging Criminal Child Abuse Prosecutions of Pregnant Drug
Addicts, 99 J. CRum. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 823, 838 (2009).
67. See Mohapatra, supra note 61, at 248.
68. Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288, 1289 (Fla. 1992).
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the umbilical cord.69

Nevada's supreme court reached the same result two years later. 70
Modern expansions of child protection statutes have been more
successful. One approach arose in the wake of laws targeting
methamphetamine labs operating near children. Alabama passed a
statute criminalizing chemical endangerment of a child in 2006,
intended to punish not only actually giving drugs to a child, but also
"exposing a child to an environment" in which the child came in
contact with drugs.7 1 Prosecutors in Alabama began applying the

statute to pregnant women on the logic that the uterus could be
considered an environment in which the child was exposed to
drugs. 72 In one case, Amanda Kimbrough gave birth after only
twenty six weeks of pregnancy to a child who lived for twenty
minutes and died as a result of "acute methamphetamine
chemical
with
charged
was
Kimbrough
intoxication."7 3
to ten
sentenced
was
and
guilty,
pleaded
endangerment of a child,
74
birth
gave
years in prison. Another woman named Hope Ankrom
six weeks prematurely to a baby in perfect health other than a
positive drug test for cocaine.75 She also was charged with chemical
endangerment of a child, pleaded guilty, and was given a suspended
three year sentence. 76 These women are examples of a surprisingly
common prosecution, as a recent report found almost 500
prosecutions of pregnant women in Alabama under the chemical
endangerment law since 2006.77

Another creative method of restraining pregnant women under
existing law is using a woman's pregnancy as justification for a
harsher sentence, imposed as a way of preventing her from
continuing behavior the court regards as unsafe. The first example
occurred in 1988, when a judge in the District of Columbia was faced
with Brenda Vaughn, charged with second-degree theft after forging

69. State v. Luster, 419 S.E.2d 32, 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
70. Sheriff v. Encoe, 885 P.2d 596, 599 (Nev. 1994).
71. ALA. CODE § 26-15-3.2 (2016).
72. Adam Nossiter, In Alabama, a Crackdown on Pregnant Drug Users, N.Y.
TIMES.COM (Mar. 15, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/15/us/15mothers.htm1.
73. Kathleen Adams, Chemical Endangermentof a Fetus: Societal Protection of
the Defenseless or Unconstitutional Invasion of Women's Rights?, 65 ALA. L. REV.
1353, 1360-61 (2014).

74. Id.
75. Ankrom v. State, 152 So. 3d 373 (Ala. Crim. App. 2011).
76. Id. at 375; see also Fentiman, supra note 58, at 407-08.
77. Nina Martin & Amy Yurkanin, Special Report: Alabama Leads Nation in
2015),
23,
(Sept.
Felons, AL.COM
Into
Turning Pregnant Women

http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2015/09/when-thewombis-a_crimescene.html.
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checks.7 8 The judge acknowledged that as a first-time offender,
Vaughn would typically be sentenced to probation.79 Because she
was six months pregnant and had tested positive for cocaine,
however, the judge wanted "to be sure she would not be released
until her pregnancy was concluded .

.

. because of concern for the

unborn child," and instead sentenced her to six months in jail.8 0
More recently, Simonne Ikerd was sentenced in 1998 to five years of
probation but did not comply with the terms of her probation and
was rearrested.8 1 At her sentencing hearing for probation violationalmost five years after her probation began-she was eleven weeks
pregnant and admitted that she was still receiving methadone
treatment for drug addiction. 82 The judge sentenced her to prison,
explicitly tying her sentence to her pregnancy. 83 As April Cherry
summarized,
The judge stated that he sentenced her to prison for the
duration of her pregnancy, "[n]ot because we want to punish
her, but because we want to save the baby." The trial
transcripts further indicate that the sole purpose of Ikerd's
incarceration was to protect the health of her fetus. For
example, the judge indicated that he would reconsider the
sentence when the baby was born or if Ikerd terminated her
pregnancy. In addition, the trial judge told the defendant's
attorney, "if she loses the baby, if there is a problem, and she
has the baby, I'll consider . .. any application that you wish
to make at that time." 84

Ikerd's sentence was reversed on appeal, albeit not until after Ikerd
gave birth to a healthy baby and was released from prison. 85 One
year later, seven-months pregnant Kari Parsons, on probation
following a shoplifting conviction, violated her probation by testing
positive for drugs.8 6 A Maryland judge sentenced her to jail,
78.

April L. Cherry, The Detention, Confinement, and Incarcerationof Pregnant

Women for the Benefit of Fetal Health, 16 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 147, 172 (2007).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 172-73 (quoting U.S. v. Vaughn, DAILY WASH. LAW REP., March 7,
1989, at 441 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 1988)).
81. Id.
82. Id.; State v. Ikerd, 850 A.2d 516, 518 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
83. Ikerd, 850 A.2d at 519-20.
84. Cherry, supra note 75, at 173-74.
85. Ikerd, 850 A.2d at 520.
86. Julie B. Ehrlich, Breaking the Law by Giving Birth: The War on Drugs, the
War on Reproductive Rights, and the War on Women, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
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explaining that he was concerned for the wellbeing of her fetus. 87
Ironically, Parsons then delivered her baby alone in a jail cell after
guards failed to seek medical help when she went into labor. 88 Three
states authorize civil commitment of pregnant women in order to
prevent drug or alcohol abuse.89
It is noteworthy that the examples above include prosecutions
that began both before and after the child's birth or the loss of a
pregnancy. Sixteen states prohibit drug use during pregnancy as
either child abuse or child neglect.90 A few states specifically
authorize or mandate drug testing of laboring women and newborns,
and federal law requires that states mandate that health care
providers notify child protective services if an infant has been
exposed to drugs before birth in order to be eligible for federal
funding,.9 1 Wendy Bach has explained that even without specific
authorization, hospitals often perform drug tests on both the baby
and woman's blood without the woman's consent. 92 What test result
is defined as a positive-both the presence of a problematic
substance and whether the test must be of the new mother or the
baby-is generally left up to individual hospitals, resulting in
considerable variation.9 3 If a newborn baby tests positive for drugs,
the mother may be prosecuted under child abuse or neglect
statutes. 94 In recent years, state legislatures have passed statutes
specifically targeting such mothers, such as Tennessee's "fetal

CHANGE 381, 390 (2008).

87.
88.

Id.
Id.

89. See Andrew J. Weisberg & Frank E. Vandervort, A Liberal Dilemma:
Respecting Autonomy While Also Protecting Inchoate Children from Prenatal
Substance Abuse, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 659, 696 (2016) (Those three states
are Minnesota, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.).
90. Kathryn A. Kellett, Miscarriage of Justice: Prenatal Substance Abusers
Need Treatment, Not Confinement Under Chemical Endangerment Laws, 40 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 455, 459 (2014).
91. Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, PUB. L. No. 108-36, 117
Stat 800.
92. Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and
Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 345 (2014).
93. For example, one Pennsylvania hospital used such a low threshold that a
woman's newborn was taken away from her for five days based on a positive drug
test triggered by the mother eating a poppyseed bagel on her way to the hospital to
give birth. Russell Goldman, Mother Settles Suit Over Poppy Bagel Drug Test,
ABCNEWS.COM (July 3, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/mother-settles-suit-poppybagel-drug-test/story?id=19567956.
94. See, e.g., Whitner v. State, 492 S.E.2d 777, 780 (S.C. 1997) (holding that the
term "child" in South Carolina's child abuse and endangerment statute included a
viable fetus who tested positive for cocaine after birth).
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assault" law.9 5 In such cases, the prosecution is based directly on the
baby's drug test results.
Women have also been prosecuted, however, for child abuse
based on the use of drugs or alcohol solely before the baby's birth,
before doctors know whether the drugs or alcohol had any negative
effect on the fetus. Typically in such cases, a pregnant woman seeks
medical care for other health reasons-in one memorable example,
after seeking help from a domestic violence organization for spousal
abuse 96-and the hospital or doctor runs a drug or alcohol test on
her blood.9 7 In 2014, for example, a pregnant woman seeking to
confirm her pregnancy who disclosed past drug use during the
course of medical examinations was charged with child abuse under
Wisconsin's so-called "cocaine mom" law authorizing the state to
detain pregnant women and appoint a guardian ad litem to
represent the fetus in child protective proceedings.9 8 A number of
states legally require doctors and nurses to report pregnant women
they suspect of drug use to law enforcement. 99 The baby may or may
not test positive for drugs at birth and may or may not have any
health issues due to the drug or alcohol use.10 0 Moreover, women

&

95. 2014 TENN. PuB. ACTS 820; see Dawn Johnsen, State Court Protection of
Reproductive Rights: The Past, the Perils, and the Promise, 29 COLUM. J. GENDER
L. 41, 49 (2015) (citing Katie McDonough, First Woman Arrested Under State Law
that
Criminalizes
Pregnancy
Outcomes,
SALON
(July
11,
2014),
http://www.salon.com/2014/07/11/firstwomanarrestedundertennessee_lawthat
criminalizespregnancy-outcomes/).
96. Stone-Manista, supra note 66, at 829 (citing Renee I. Solomon, Note, Future
Fear: Prenatal Duties Imposed by Private Parties, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 411, 416
(1991)); Woman Who Faced Charges Has Baby, Cm. TRIB., June 17, 1990, at C22.
97. Stone-Manista, supra note 66, at 829-30 (citing Claudia Pinto, Medical
Officials Question Arrest of PregnantPatient,TENNESSEAN, Apr. 24, 2008).
98. See Jessica Mason Pieklo, Pregnant Wisconsin Woman Jailed Under State's
"Personhood"-Like
Law,
REWIERE.COM
(Dec.
12,
2014),
http://rhrealtycheck.orglarticle/2014/12/12/pregnant-wisconsin-woman-jailed-statespersonhood-like-law/.
99. Ian Vandewalker, Taking the Baby Before It's Born: Termination of the
ParentalRights of Women Who Use Illegal Drugs While Pregnant, 32 N.Y.U. REv. L.
& SOC. CHANGE 423, 431 (2008); see also Bach, supra note 92, at 350.
100. Notably, the Supreme Court held in 2001 that a program at a South
Carolina hospital in which hospital staff directly reported suspected drug use by
pregnant women to law enforcement violated the women's Fourth Amendment
rights. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). A key element of the
Court's reasoning was that the drug tests were performed with the "immediate
objective" of gathering evidence for law enforcement purposes. Id. at 69. Hospital
staff remain free, therefore, to report positive drug tests to law enforcement so long
as the tests were not performed with an eye to criminal rather than medical
concerns. See also Deborah Ahrens, Incarcerated Childbirth and Broader "Birth
Control"- Autonomy, Regulation, and the State, 80 Mo. L. REV. 1, 34 (2015); Bach,
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who have used drugs or alcohol during pregnancy and are aware
that doctors and nurses may report them to law enforcement may be
less likely to seek any prenatal care for fear of legal sanction. 101
Civil proceedings may also be triggered by drug use during
pregnancy, such as the state taking custody of the child. Again,
courts and prosecutors have wrestled with the timing of the drug use
and under what statutes such proceedings may be commenced.
After the child's birth, it is clear that drug use while pregnant
may justify civil actions taken against the mother. All states agree
that use of drugs or alcohol while pregnant may trigger finding a
child to be neglected, and can thus justify taking custody of the child
or terminating the mother's parental rights. 102 Sixteen states specify
that drug use while pregnant is child abuse.10 3
Before the child's birth, however, the picture is less clear. Some
states and prosecutors have attempted to use child abuse and
neglect statutes to punish or control pregnant women before birth of
the child has taken place. Reception of such actions has varied. A
majority of states allow pregnant women to be subjected to civil
commitment orders in order to treat and prevent future drug
abuse. 104 Some courts, however, have rejected such logic. In 1997,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected an attempt to require a
pregnant woman to participate in a drug treatment program as the
result of a child neglect proceeding, as the child in question was still
a fetus. 0 5 The case began when the Wisconsin Department of
Human Services petitioned the juvenile court, reasoning that the
unborn child was in need of protection.1 06 The argument was
supported by the pregnant woman's doctor, who provided an
affidavit stating that in his professional opinion, in the absence of
intervention to prevent further drug use by the pregnant woman, the
unborn child would suffer serious harm. 0 7 The juvenile court then

supra note 92, at 343-44.
101. See Adam J. Duso & John Stogner, Re-Evaluating the Criminalizationof In
Utero Alcohol Exposure: A Harm-Reduction Approach, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
621, 638-40 (2016).
102. Linda C. Fentiman, The New "Fetal Protection'- The Wrong Answer to the
Crisis of Inadequate Health Care for Women and Children, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 537,
581 (2006).
103. See Adams, supra note 74, at 1355; Goodwin, supra note 61, at 795-96;
Vandewalker, supra note 94, at 425.
104. Fentiman, supra note 99, at 566.
105. State v. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d 729, 739-40 (Wis. 1997); see also Fentiman,
supra note 99, at 567.
106. Kruzicki, 561 N.W.2d at 732.

107.

Id.
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ordered the unborn child to be detained in a hospital, recognizing
that this would "by necessity result in the detention of the unborn
child's mother."10 8 Similarly, in 2003, the Arkansas Supreme Court
overturned an Arkansas trial court's attempt to take a "child" into
state custody before the child's birth by incarcerating the pregnant
woman.109
More troublingly, there is some evidence that court rejection of
such attempts may have little impact on future interventions. Lynn
M. Paltrow, the Executive Director of National Advocates for
Pregnant Women, 110 co-authored a study in 2013 analyzing over four
hundred examples of such interventions, and found that such
deprivations of liberty . . . occurred in spite of a lack of
legislative authority, in defiance of numerous and significant
appellate court decisions dismissing or overturning such
actions, and contrary to the extraordinary consensus by
public health organizations, medical groups, and experts
that such actions undermine rather than further maternal,
fetal, and child health."n
Although alcohol is a legal substance, it is often lumped together
with drugs and similarly used as a basis for both criminal and civil
actions. 112 Alcohol consumption while pregnant may be incorporated
in neglect or abuse assessments and in five states may justify orders
placing pregnant women into alcoholism treatment in order to
prevent them from drinking more alcohol. 1 3 Other charges may also
follow from alcohol consumption. For example, in 2013, a Tennessee
woman was charged with driving under the influence and child
endangerment based on drinking alcohol while she was pregnant
and crashing her car. 114 Alcohol is generally viewed, however, as less
dangerous for the fetus, in the sense that while there is consensus

108. Id.; see also Cherry, supra note 75, at 163.
109. Bennett v. Collier, 95 S.W.3d 782, 785 (Ark. 2003); Fentiman, supra note
99, at 567; see also People ex rel. H., 74 P.3d 494 (Colo. App. 2003) (rejecting a
dependency or neglect proceeding brought on behalf of "Unborn Baby Boy H.").
110.

NATIONAL

ADVOCATES

FOR

PREGNANT

WOMEN,

ABOUT

US,

http://www.advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/main/about-us/staff.php.
111. Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on
Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973-2005: Implications for Women's Legal
Status and Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 299, 320 (2013).
112. See Adams, supra note 74, at 1354, 1362.
113. Gaia Bernstein & Zvi Triger, Over-Parenting,44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1221,
1259 (2011).
114. Michele Goodwin, The PregnancyPenalty, 26 HEALTH MATRIX 17, 24 (2016).
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excessive use is dangerous for the pregnancy and can lead to such
conditions such as fetal alcohol syndrome, it is less clear that
occasional consumption is a hazard. 1 5
Counterintuitively, drug use may occupy a similarly medical
gray area. Running against most people's assumptions, it is not
entirely clear that the use of illegal drugs while pregnant actually
causes harm to the fetus. One reason is evidentiary, in the sense
that it is rare that a pregnant woman uses only one illegal drug, so
that tying causation to one substance (as opposed to other drugs,
both legal and illegal, used during the pregnancy) is difficult to
establish." 6 Other factors unrelated to drug use may also play
important roles. Expert witnesses before the South Carolina
Supreme Court explained that cocaine use while pregnant may be
"no more harmful to a fetus than nicotine use, poor nutrition, lack of
prenatal care, or other conditions commonly associated with the
urban poor." 117 Another reason is potentially broader: fears as to the
consequences of illegal drugs have not been proven to be accurate. In
the 1980s, the media created near-hysteria over the prospect of large
numbers of violent or disabled children exposed to crack cocaine in
utero. Not only have such children not materialized, but research
indicates that children whose mothers used crack cocaine while
1 18
pregnant face few of the dangers and harms discussed.
Despite this slightly muddied picture, drug use during pregnancy
is one of the most commonly and severely punished actions, bringing
the full weight of both criminal and civil law down upon the
pregnant woman. The next section discusses a broader category
reaching into a new area of law: risks during pregnancy as torts
committed against the fetus.
B. Risks during Pregnancyas Torts
Other types of arguably dangerous or negligent behavior have
occasionally become the basis of tort suits brought against the
mother for actions taken while she was pregnant, with mixed
results. Such suits are generally brought by the father on behalf of
the child. 1 9 Linda Fentiman chronicled six such lawsuits, which

115. See EMILY OSTER, EXPECTING BETTER 39 (2013); Duso & Stogner, supra
note 101, at 624-26.
116. Kira Proehl, Pregnancy Crimes: New Worries to Expect When You're
Expecting, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 661, 685 (2013).
117. McKnight v. State, 661 S.E.2d 354, 358 fn.2 (S.C. 2008).
118. Proehl, supra note 109, at 685-86.
119. The focus of this paper is on legal sanctions placed upon the pregnant
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present an even split of whether courts allowed such claims to go
forward. 120 In three cases, courts rejected the arguments, largely
because the court saw no limit to the broad range of conduct to
which such actions could be applied. As one Massachusetts court
explained,
[D]uring the period of gestation, almost all aspects of a
woman's life may have an impact, for better or for worse, on
her developing fetus. A fetus can be injured not only by
physical force, but by the mother's exposure, unwitting or
intentional, to chemicals and other substances, both
dangerous and nondangerous, at home or in the workplace,
or by the mother's voluntary ingestion of drugs, alcohol, or
tobacco. A pregnant woman may place her fetus in danger by
engaging in activities involving a risk of physical harm or by
engaging in activities, such as most sports, that are
generally not considered to be perilous. A pregnant woman
may jeopardize the health of her fetus by taking medication
(prescription or over-the-counter) or, in other cases, by not
taking medication. She also may endanger the well-being of
her fetus by not following her physician's advice with respect
to prenatal care or by exercising her constitutional right not
to receive medical treatment.
Recognizing a pregnant woman's legal duty of care in
negligence to her unborn child would present an almost
unlimited number of circumstances that would likely give

rise to litigation.121
The other two cases -one involving a car accident while the
pregnant woman was driving, 122 the other involving use of alcohol

woman for her conduct, but it is worth noting the conflicting tort law relating to
medical care for a pregnant woman in the process of delivery and the child to whom
she gives birth. Jamie Abrams has incisively argued that "childbirth litigation today
is framed around a fore-grounded fetal harms focus and a back-grounded maternal
harms focus, ... [which is] threatening to the interests of birthing women as patients
and putative plaintiffs in the tort system." Jamie R. Abrams, Distorted and
Diminished Tort Claims for Women, 34 CARDOzO L. REV. 1955, 1975 (2013).
120. Fentiman, supra note 58, at 412-16; Linda C. Fentiman, Are Mothers
Hazardous to Their Children's Health?: Law, Culture, and the Framingof Risk, 21

VA. J. Soc. POLY & L. 295, 323 (2014).
121. Remy v. MacDonald, 801 N.E.2d 260, 263 (Mass. 2004) (internal citation
omitted).
122. Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355 (Ill. 1988).
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and drugs while pregnantl 23-similarly rebuffed later tort suits with
comparable logic, concerned that if a pregnant woman was deemed
to have a cognizable legal duty of care to her fetus, it would be
difficult to define or limit that duty. 124
By contrast, three courts allowed tort suits against a mother for
her conduct while pregnant to proceed. Two of the cases involved
claims relating to insurance payments, which might have
complicated the perceived equities of the lawsuit. One court held
that a pregnant woman whose child was born with brain damage
after she was hit by a car while crossing the street was "required to
act with . . . the same standard of care as that required of her once
the child is born." 125 Another court simply held in the context of a
negligent driving claim that courts need not "den[y] compensation
26
for such injury merely because of the identity of the tortfeasor."1 In
the oldest case, a 1980 suit filed in Michigan, the court attempted to
cabin such claims by specifying that if the woman's conduct in
taking Tetracycline that apparently led to her child's discolored
teeth was a "reasonable exercise of parental discretion," then her
127
actions would be immune from tort suitS.
A handful of examples obviously does not indicate any
widespread policing of pregnant women through tort law, but as
other justifications for regulation become more common, tort suits
may become a more common method of financially punishing
mothers for choices made during their pregnancy. 128 The rules of
maternity not only police mothers, but also help to define what is a
reasonable or responsible choice. The full ambit of the rules of
maternity thus may affect what is viewed as a reasonable exercise of
parental discretion and indirectly expand potential tort suits.

123. Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (stating that
while "the law wisely no longer treats a fetus as only a part of the mother, the law
would ignore the equally important physical realities of pregnancy if it treated the
fetus as an individual entirely separate from his mother.") (emphasis omitted).
124. Id. at 477-78; Stallman, 531 N.E.2d at 361.
125. Bonte v. Bonte, 616 A.2d 464, 464, 466 (N.H. 1992).
126. Nat'l Cas. Co. v. N. Trust Bank of Fla., 807 So. 2d 86, 87 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2001).
127. Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 871 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Plumley v. Klein, 199 N.W.2d 169 (Mich. 1972)).
128. The logic of punishing reckless behavior by pregnant women may be
generally exported into criminal law. A pregnant women in New York who caused a
car accident, for example, was recently convicted of manslaughter for the loss of her
34-week old fetus, although the conviction was overturned on appeal. See People v.
Jorgensen, 41 N.E. 778, 779-80 (N.Y. 2015).
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Thus far, the potential harms to the pregnant woman as vessel
for the fetus have not risen to the level of ending her life and the
fetus's along with her. The next section addresses what happens if a
pregnant woman attempts to end her own life.

C. Self-harm as Child Abuse
A particularly complicated example of how a pregnant woman's
body is legally viewed as the vessel for her child is unsuccessful
suicide attempts by pregnant women. In the 1990s, Deborah
Zimmerman was taken to the hospital after becoming extremely
intoxicated in a bar. After she declared to a nurse that she planned
to drink both herself and her fetus to death, she consented to an
emergency c-section and gave birth to a baby who tested positive for
alcohol and exhibited symptoms of fetal alcohol syndrome. 129
Obviously her actions might have given rise to legal actions
discussed above such as child abuse or potential termination of her
parental status due to her alcohol abuse. Instead, Zimmerman was
charged with attempted first degree homicide for trying to kill her
child. 130 The court of appeals rejected the charge, explaining that
using such logic, "a woman could risk criminal charges for any
perceived self-destructive behavior during her pregnancy that may
result in injuries to her unborn child."13 1 This rejection, however, did
not end such prosecutions. More recently, a woman in Iowa was
arrested after she sought treatment in the hospital after falling
down a flight of stairs at home, when hospital employees believed
she may have fallen down the stairs intentionally. 132
Finally, a woman named Beibei Shuai attempted suicide by
eating rat poison after her boyfriend broke up with her.1 33 She was
eight months pregnant at the time, and although she gave birth by
emergency c-section, the baby died two days later. 134 Shuai, who was
herself hospitalized not only for the effects of the poison but also for
psychiatric treatment, was then charged with murder and attempted

129. State v. Deborah J.Z., 596 N.W.2d 490, 491-92 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
130. Id. at 491.
131. Id. at 494.
132. Goodwin, supra note 61, at 806-08. (Prosecutors dropped the case three
weeks later.).
133. Andrew S. Murphy, A Survey of State Fetal Homicide Laws and Their
PotentialApplicability to Pregnant Women Who Harm Their Own Fetuses, 89 IND.
L.J. 847, 854 (2014).
134. Id. at 855.
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feticide.1 3a Shuai's attorney filed a motion to dismiss the charges,
which was denied by both the trial court and the Indiana Court of
Appeals. 136 After the trial court later made evidentiary rulings that
weakened the state's case as to the link between the rat poison and
the baby's injuries, however, Shuai agreed to a plea deal under
which she pleaded guilty to misdemeanor criminal recklessness and
was sentenced to time served. 137
D. Keeping the Vessel Alive
In extreme contexts, courts have even dispensed with the
mother's consent and treated her near-lifeless body as a literal
incubator for the pregnancy. Most states have statutes prohibiting
hospitals from removing a pregnant woman from life support in
order to keep the pregnant woman's body functioning long enough to
be delivered of a viable baby.1 38 Many states do not allow a proxy
decisionmaker to remove life support if she is pregnant when she
becomes incapacitated.13 9 Some states also specify that statutory
decisionmakers-the default person with power to make medical
decisions for an incapacitated person, usually a spouse, parent, or
adult child-cannot direct a hospital to remove life support from a
pregnant woman.1 40 Most states even refuse to enforce the woman's
wishes not to be placed on life support expressed in a written
advance directive or living will if she is pregnant, with some
variation depending on whether the fetus is viable and the likelihood
that the fetus can develop to viability if life support is continued.141
A number of women over the last few decades have been kept on
life support in order to continue a pregnancy to term. Sometimes the

&

135. Shuai v. State, 966 N.E.2d 619, 622-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012); see also Proehl,
supra note 109, at 671-73; Jennifer Block, Jailed for a Suicide Attempt, THE DAILY
BEAST (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/04113/jenniferblock-on-bei-bei-shuais-feticide-ordeal.html.
136. Shuai, 966 N.E.2d at 621-23.
137. See April L. Cherry, Shifting Our Focus from Retribution to Social Justice:
An Alternative Vision for the Treatment of Pregnant Women Who Harm Their
Fetuses, 28 J.L. & HEALTH 6, 12 (2015).
138. See Katherine A. Taylor, Compelling Pregnancy at Death's Door, 7 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 85, 87 (1997).
139. Id. at 100.
140. Id. at 102.
141. See Wendy Adele Humphrey, "But I'm Brain-Dead and Pregnant"-Advance
DirectivePregnancy Exclusions and End-of-Life Wishes, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN
L. 669, 676 (2015); Kristeena L. Johnson, Forcing Life on the Dead: Why the
Pregnancy Exemption Clause of the Kentucky Living Will Directive Act Is
Unconstitutional, 100 KY. L.J. 209, 210-11 (2012).
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woman's wishes were unclear-in 1996, a twenty-nine year old
woman who had been in a coma for ten years was raped by a worker
in the nursing home and became pregnant. 142 Her family decided to
continue the pregnancy, and the grandmother was awarded
guardianship of the child. 143 In other examples, the medical dispute
amplifies existing family conflict, as when Donna Piazzi's husband
wished for her to be taken off life support, but the undisputed
genetic father of her sixteen-week fetus successfully petitioned for a
court order to keep Piazzi on life support until the fetus was
viable. 1 " In another case, the genetic father successfully sought an
order keeping his seventeen-week pregnant common law wife on life
support against the wishes of her mother. 145 In other cases, all
surrogate decisionmakers agree that the pregnant woman would not
have wished to be kept on life support, as in the case of Marlise
Muiloz, kept on life support for two months in the hopes of bringing
her fourteen-week pregnancy to term. 146 A few women have
attempted to challenge such statutes through requests for
declaratory judgments, but courts have dismissed the claims as
hypothetical, given that the plaintiffs were not on life support when
they filed the lawsuitS.147
The first rule of maternity is problematically strong in that it is
difficult to limit. It is hard to see where such a strong focus on the
health of a fetus as opposed to the agency of a pregnant woman
should stop. If every action taken by a pregnant woman has an effect
on her eventual child's health, then every move she makes could in
theory trigger legal liability. Taken to its extreme, all sorts of
conditions not under a woman's control such as age or disease affect
the health of the pregnancy she carries, and could correspondingly
generate liability for "extreme indifference to human life," as the
South Carolina Supreme Court used in the context of Regina

142.

Taylor, supra note 138, at 148.

143.

Id.

144. Univ. Health Servs. Inc. v. Piazzi, No. CV86-RCCV-464 (Ga. Super. Ct. Aug.
4, 1986); see also Humphrey, supra note 141, at 689-91; James M. Jordan III,
Incubating for the State: The PrecariousAutonomy of Persistently Vegetative and
Brain-DeadPregnant Women, 22 GA. L. REV. 1103, 1108-12 (1988).
145. Emma Murphy Sisti, Die Free or Live: The Constitutionality of New
Hampshire'sLiving Will Pregnancy Exception, 30 VT. L. REV. 143, 143 (2005).
146. See Humphrey, supra note 141, at 669-70; Goodwin, supra note 61, at 81415.
147. See, e.g., Gabrynowicz v. Heitkamp, 904 F. Supp. 1061 (D.N.D. 1995);
DiNino v. State, 684 P.2d 1297 (Wash. 1984) (en banc); see also Fentiman, supra note
102, at 565-66.

2017]

THE RULES OF MATERNITY

393

McKnight's conviction for using crack cocaine while pregnant.148
Even the method of conception could be treated as a potentially risky
choice, as the potential dangers to pregnancies begun through
assisted reproductive technologies can be compared to the potential
149
dangers of drug and alcohol use while pregnant.
Such comparisons may seem ludicrous, but it is not difficult to
imagine at least a few steps down a slippery slope.1 50 In 2013, three
doctors published an article in the Journal of Legal Medicine raising
the possibility of prosecuting women for being too obese during their
pregnancy. The physicians argued:
The mounting evidence of fetal harm, infant mortality,
complications during childbirth, and the escalating health
care costs associated with obese parturients, demands that
the health care system consider alternative solutions to this
growing problem. Given the willingness of our legal system
to hold parturients accountable for ramifications of drug and
alcohol use, it does not appear that extending fetal
protection to include obesity-associated complications is an
unreasonable direction of the laws governing maternal-fetal
medicine. 15 1
In 1986, Dawn Johnsen wrote of the prospect that a woman
could be "held liable for any behavior during her pregnancy having
potentially adverse effects on her fetus, including failing to eat
properly. . . ." 152 Recent years are proving her correct.
The women punished by such judgment of their choices,
moreover, do not reflect the characteristics of all pregnant women
generally. As Dorothy Roberts famously wrote in the Harvard Law
Review, women of color who use drugs while pregnant are
53
disproportionately targeted for state coercion and punishment.1

148. See Proehl, supra note 116, at 667-68, 683-84.
149. See Fentiman, supra note 117, at 397-98.
150. See Deborah M. Santello, Maternal Tort Liability for PrenatalInjuries, 22
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 747, 764-70 (1988) (listing potential teratogenic harms to fetus
caused by mother, including infectious diseases and sexually transmitted infection).
151. Christopher M. Burkle, Hugh M. Smith, & Katherine W. Arendt, Punishing
Maternal Behavior: Potential Legal Consequences for Obesity-Associated Poor Fetal
Outcome in the United States, 34 J. LEGAL MED. 251, 270 (2013).
152. Dawn E. Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's
Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599,
606-07 (1986) (outlining constitutional limits to expanding the rights of a fetus).
153. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of
Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991).
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Nancy Ehrenreich has similarly explained how the same actions by
different types of new mothers are viewed very differently. In the
context of women who gave birth without medical assistance and lost
the baby during or shortly after birth, young white women were
often viewed as having made terrible mistakes, whereas "older white
women, low-income white women, and all women of color were
perceived as bad girls and sentenced accordingly. The discourse
surrounding these women depicted them as willfully refusing to give
birth in the hospital as they 'should' have." 154
The judgment placed upon the "right" kind of pregnant woman
and "right" kind of mother is heightened when one considers the role
of the father. Men who suffer from alcoholism or drug addiction
father babies with higher risks of harms such as low birth weight
and birth defects. 155 Men can be exposed to dangerous chemicals in
the workplace that have similar ill effects on their children and can
engage in all sorts of conduct in the presence of a pregnant woman,
such as smoking, that harms the developing fetus.156 Yet a man's
choices that may affect his future children are rarely socially
criticized, let alone legally punished.
Instead, only the woman's behavior is policed and regulated with
the force of law. It is only pregnant women who are told that their
paramount concern during pregnancy should be how each choice
may affect the fetus, even though partners, other family members,
and employers may also affect the health of the fetus through other
environmental factors. The first lesson of motherhood learned during
pregnancy is that the pregnant woman alone must make choices to
protect her future child. The next rule specifies that the woman
should not make such choices independently, but instead should
defer to the judgments of others.

III. RULE 2: DOCTOR KNows BEST
Pregnant women seek advice regarding healthy behaviors from
many sources: friends who have gone through pregnancy, family
members, their own mothers, books, and the internet. One source of
guidance, however, is promoted above all others by the law: doctors.
The second rule of maternity tells pregnant women that doctor

154.

Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DUKE L.J. 492, 518

(1993).
155. Ehrlich, supra note 82, at 389-90.
156. See Fentiman, supra note 120, at 302-03; Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of
Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions from Welfare "Reform," Family, and Criminal
Law, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 688, 715 (1998).
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ven though medical
knows best. To go against a doctor's advice
opinions are diverse and often disagree-is to negligently or
recklessly risk harm to the child and consequently expose the
mother to legal liability. Pregnant women who refuse medical
treatment, fail to comply with medical orders, or reject a doctor's
advice as to medical care may be subjected to coercive or punitive
action by the state. Commentators noted a wave of more aggressive
enforcement of following doctors' advice in the late 1990s, and we
may now be in the midst of another upward cycle.157
The most direct conflict that the state may resolve through a
court order occurs when a pregnant woman refuses treatment her
doctor believes is necessary. Although there is a general right to
refuse medical care,158 the presence of a fetus, particularly a viable
fetus, introduces complexities that have justified orders mandating
care in a number of jurisdictions.15 9 Sometimes the conflict between
doctor and pregnant woman is stark. For example, a Massachusetts
woman named Rebecca Corneau was under investigation, along with
several other members of her religious community called "The Body,"
for allegedly failing to provide any medical assistance to her son
Jeremiah at birth, leading to the baby's death by choking. 16o While
law enforcement investigated The Body members, eventually
convincing one to lead them to the buried bodies of Jeremiah and
another infant who had been starved to death, it became
increasingly apparent that Corneau was pregnant again. A family
court ordered Corneau incarcerated so that she could receive medical
care in a prison hospital. Corneau did not appeal the order and was
placed in jail until she gave birth, at which point the court
terminated her parental rights. 161
157.

Fentiman, supra note 58, at 400.

158. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
159. See Rona Kaufman Kitchen, Holistic Pregnancy: Rejecting the Theory of the
Adversarial Mother, 26 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 207, 209 (2015) ("The great tragedy
is that this adversarial view is becoming the dominant legal paradigm for all
pregnancies.").
160. Michele Nicolosi, Forced Prenatal Care, SALON.com (Sept. 15, 2000),
http://www.salon.com/2000/09/15/forcedprenatall.
161. See Fentiman, supra note 102, at 567-68. Corneau's reproductive status
continued to catch the attention of the family court. The following year, Corneau
appeared visibly pregnant at a custody hearing for her youngest child held eleventh
months after she gave birth in prison. David Linton, Rebecca Corneau Expecting New
Child, THE SUN CHRON. (Sept. 13, 2001), http://www.thesunchronicle.com/rebecca2
corneau-expecting-new-child/article_9584fe87-eOcl-5e6f-82bf-f66382ecef b.html.
Corneau
again,
was
pregnant
she
When the authorities began investigating whether
and her husband claimed that she had suffered a miscarriage the following month.
Law enforcement did not believe this claim, particularly since Jeremiah's birth and
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Other conflicts arise over specific medical recommendations or
orders, as opposed to blanket refusals of all health care. One
common site of disagreement is blood transfusions, generally refused
by Jehovah's Witnesses, among others. As early as the 1960s,
hospitals successfully sought court orders allowing them to give
blood transfusions to pregnant women in the interest of protecting
the fetus. 162 Such orders have been issued even when the fetus has
not reached viability, reasoning that even a nonviable fetus's
interests as a potential life are more significant than the pregnant
woman's right to refuse medical care.16 3 In a 1985 case in New York
that arose in the context of a woman who consented to a c-section
but not to blood transfusions, the court even ordered that the
hospital could give blood transfusions to the woman after the csection was finished, as such transfusions might be required to
complete the procedure successfully. 164
A frequent site of disagreement between pregnant women and
medical and legal authorities is the method of giving birth. Many
commentators have described birth as increasingly medicalized in
recent years1 65 and correspondingly increasingly controlled by
doctors rather than the laboring mother. 166 Only about one percent of
pregnant women give birth either at home or in a birth center
housed outside of a hospital, where midwives rather than doctors
supervise labor. 6 7 Courts have routinely rejected arguments that

death were never reported, and the two parents were incarcerated for contempt of
court for failing to either produce the baby to which Corneau gave birth or provide
information about where they disposed of the miscarried fetus. Jailed Parents Told
to Show Baby, ABCNEWS.COM (Feb. 14, 2001), http://abcnews.go.com/GMAl
story?id=126346.
162. See Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem'I Hosp. v. Anderson, 201 A.2d 537,
538 (N.J. 1964).
163. In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 900 (Sup. Ct. 1985); see also Julie B.
Murphy, Competing Interests: When a Pregnant Woman Refuses to Consent to
Medical Treatment Beneficial to Her Fetus, 35 SUFFOLKU. L. REV. 189, 201 (2001).
164. Crouse Irving Mem'1 Hosp., Inc. v. Paddock, 485 N.Y.S.2d 443, 445 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1985); see also Murphy, supra note 163, at 201.
165. See, e.g., Jamie R. Abrams, From 'Barbarity" to Regularity:A Case Study of
"Unnecesarean"Malpractice Claims, 63 S.C. L. REV. 191, 225-28 (2011); Sylvia A.
Law, Childbirth:An Opportunity for Choice That Should Be Supported, 32 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 345 (2008).
166. Ehrenreich, supra note 154, at 536.
167. Anna Hickman, Note, Born (Not So) Free: Legal Limits on the Practice of
Unassisted Childbirth or Freebirthing in the United States, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1651,
1654 (2010).
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women have a right to midwifery rather than a doctor's management
of the birthing process.168
Medicalization is often criticized in the context of c-sections, once
used as a last-ditch extreme attempt to save the life of a baby when
69
As Nancy Ehrenreich
the pregnant mother had already died.s
argued,
Protecting a fetus often entails imposing certain risks on the
woman carrying it; a Cesarean section, for example, is at
least twice as likely as a vaginal birth to result in the death
of the mother. Yet this risk becomes irrelevant if the cultural
norm already prescribes that she be willing to sacrifice
70
anything and everything for her children (born or unborn).1
Not only are women pressured and sometimes coerced by their
doctors to deliver by c-section, particularly if past deliveries were
also by c-section, but the state has repeatedly either punished
women for refusing to have a c-section if the baby is arguably
harmed by that decision, or actually ordered women to undergo the
procedure.171
About ten years ago, Melissa Rowland initially refused to
schedule a c-section to deliver her twins.172 A few days later she
consented, but one twin was stillborn.1 73 An autopsy of the stillborn
child indicated that he had died two days before Rowland gave

168. See Joanne Rouse, Indiana'sMidwifery Statute and the Legal BarriersThat
Will Render It Unworkable, 48 IND. L. REV. 663, 675-82 (2015); Rachel A. D.
Marquardt, Balancing Babies, Birth, and Belief: A Legal Argument Against Planned
Homebirth, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 607, 619-20 (2013); Rebecca A. Spence,
Abandoning Women to Their Rights: What Happens When Feminist Jurisprudence
Ignores Birthing Rights, 19 CARDOzO J.L. & GENDER 75, 93-94 (2012).
169. See Erin P. Davenport, Court Ordered Cesarean Sections: Why Courts
Should Not Be Allowed to Use a Balancing Test, 18 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 79,
80 (2010).
170. Ehrenreich, supra note 154, at 537; see also Farah Diaz-Tello, When the
Invisible Hand Wields A Scalpel: Maternity Care in the Market Economy, 18 CUNY
L. REV. 197, 203 (2015) ("The health risks of cesarean surgery are mostly borne by
the birthing person, and largely deferred into subsequent pregnancies: with each
cesarean, the risk of maternal morbidity increases significantly.").
171. But see In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994); In re A.C.,
573 A.2d 1235, 1246-47 (D.C. 1990); Bradley J. Glass, Note, A ComparativeAnalysis
of the Right of A Pregnant Woman to Refuse Medical Treatment for Herself and Her
Viable Fetus: The United States and United Kingdom, 11 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
507, 523 (2001).
172. Monica K. Miller, Refusal to Undergo A CesareanSection: A Woman's Right
or A CriminalAct?, 15 HEALTH MATRIX 383, 383 (2005).
173. Proeh, supra note 116, at 669.
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birth. 174 Because the child died after her doctor told her she should
have a c-section in the interest of her children, Rowland was charged
with first-degree homicide and child endangerment and eventually
pleaded guilty to two counts of child endangerment. 175
Other women have been directly ordered to undergo a c-section.
The first prominent example occurred in Georgia in 1981 when
Jessie Mae Jefferson was told she had a complete placenta previa
thirty-nine weeks into her pregnancy. 176 Placenta previa, meaning
that the placenta grows to cover the cervix, can be extremely
dangerous for both the pregnant woman and the fetus she carries. 177
Jefferson was told that if she attempted to deliver vaginally, her
baby would almost certainly die, and she faced even odds of
surviving labor. 178 By contrast, both Jefferson and her child would
almost definitely survive a c-section. 179 After Jefferson refused a csection, the hospital asked for a court order that would authorize it
to perform a c-section without her consent.180 The court issued the
order, as well as placed Jefferson's fetus in the temporary custody of
the Georgia Department of Human Resources. 8 1 Ironically, the order
was rendered unnecessary when prior to the c-section, Jefferson's
placenta shifted place and no longer covered her cervix, making a
vaginal delivery safe. 182
Jefferson's case is obviously an example in which the state's
argument for intervention is particularly strong, as there was good
reason to believe that her refusal to deliver via c-section would result
in the death of her baby. Similar orders, however, have been issued
in contexts where the potential danger is much less stark. For
example, in 1996 Laura Pemberton was at the center of an even
more dramatic legal showdown. 183 Pemberton had given birth by csection in 1995, after her own diagnosis of placenta previa.1 84
Because her previous c-section had involved both vertical and
horizontal incisions, when she became pregnant again, she could not

174.

Miller, supra note 172, at 383.

175.

Id. at 383-84.

176.

Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Cnty. Hosp. Auth., 274 S.E.2d 457, 458 (Ga.

1981).
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Cherry, supra note 75, at 161.
Proehl, supra note 116, at 670; see also Cherry, supra note 805, at 160-61.

183. Paul Christopher Estaris Torio, Nature Versus Suture: Why VBAC Should
Still Be in Vogue, 31 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 487, 488 (2010).
184. Id. at 487
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find a hospital willing to let her attempt a vaginal birth after csection (VBAC), as the doctors were concerned by the small risk that
her c-section scars could rupture. 8 Pemberton and her husband
found a midwife willing to supervise her birth at home, and she went
into labor naturally. 186 After two days of labor, however, she was
dehydrated and went to a hospital for IV fluids. 187 Doctors at the
hospital told her that she should deliver the child by c-section and if
she refused to consent to the operation, she could not have the IV
fluids. 188 Nurses at the hospital examined her and said there was no
indication that the c-section scars on her uterus were in danger of
189
rupturing, so Pemberton returned home.
The hospital, however, remained concerned for Pemberton's
safety if she attempted to continue in labor and obtained a court
19
order telling her to return to the hospital and deliver by c-section.
The order was enforced when law enforcement and paramedics went
to Pemberton's home, restrained her on a stretcher, and removed her
from her home to an ambulance. 1 9 ' A judge came to the hospital and
visited her exam room, where Pemberton attempted to argue that
she should be allowed to progress through labor without surgical
19 2
intervention (while still in labor and experiencing contractions).
193
The judge refused and ordered the c-section to proceed. Pemberton
later sued the hospital, alleging that the hospital violated her right
to privacy and due process, had falsely imprisoned her, and had
acted negligently.1 94 A district court rejected the claims in 1999,
reasoning that "[w]hatever the scope of Ms. Pemberton's personal
constitutional rights in this situation, they clearly did not outweigh
the interests of the State of Florida in preserving the life of the

185. Notably, from the early 1980s until 1996, physicians encouraged women to
try to deliver vaginally after a previous c-section. As of 2010 the American Congress
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists gives a "cautious endorsement" to VBAC
attempts, 60-80% of which will be successful. Diaz-Tello, supra note 159, at 204-07.
186. Torio, supra note 183, at 487-88.
187. Id. at 488.
188. Id.

189.

Id.

190.

Id.

191.
192.
193.

Id.
Id.
Id.

194.

Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem'1 Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247,

1249 (N.D. Fla. 1999).
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unborn child."195 (That same year, Pemberton successfully gave birth
to twins through a vaginal delivery while in hiding. 196
The district court's reasoning is characteristic of such disputes,
finding that the state's interest in the life of the fetus outweighs the
pregnant mother's autonomy right to control her own medical care
and consent to surgery. 197 In some cases, the laboring mother has
evaded the initial hospital seeking a court order, such as Amber
Marlowe. In 2004, she left a hospital that successfully sought a court
order giving doctors the authority to deliver Marlowe's child by csection, justified by the doctor's concern that the baby might weigh
98
up to thirteen pounds.s
Marlowe went to another hospital and
vaginally delivered an eleven-pound baby.199 In 2009, Joy Szabo was
told by her hospital that it had changed its policy regarding VBACS
midway through her pregnancy, and despite having delivered her
third child at that hospital as a VBAC delivery, she would have to
consent to a c-section. 200 She asked the hospital CEO what would
happen if she arrived in labor and refused to consent, and was told
the hospital would seek a court order forcing her to undergo the
surgery. 201 Szabo moved over three hundred miles away and
successfully delivered via VBAC in a different hospital. 202 Another
woman whose doctor emailed her in 2013 threatening to call the
police if she did not schedule a c-section sought legal assistance and
public support and successfully convinced the doctor to back down. 203
Despite legal and medical ethical support for the choices of the
pregnant woman, however, the National Advocates for Pregnant
Women (NAPW) reported half a dozen similar incidents in Florida
alone. 204

195. Id. at 1251.
196. Torio, supra note 183, at 489.
197. See also In re Madyun, 114 Daily Wash. Law Rptr. 2233, 2240 (D.C. Super.
Ct. 1986).
198. Goodwin, supra note 61, at 817.

199.

Id.

200.

Diaz-Tello, supra note 159, at 217.

201.
202.

Id. at 218.
Id.

203. Letitia Stein, USF Obstetrician Threatens to Call Police if Patient Doesn't
Report
for
C-Section,
TAMPABAYTIMEs.COM
(Mar.
6,
2013),
http://
www.tampabay.com/news/health/usf-obstetrician-threatens-to-call-police-if-patientdoesnt-report-for/2107387.
204. See Jodi Jacobson, Florida Hospital Demands Woman Undergo Forced CSection, RH REALITY CHECK (July 25, 2014), http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2014
/07/25/florida-hospital-demands-woman-undergo-forced-c-section/; see also Burton v.
State, 49 So. 3d 263, 264 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (reversing a trial court order
forcing a mother into the hospital to deliver by c-section, but issuing only after the c-
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If such deliveries do not result in a healthy child, however, the
woman risks legal sanction. In 2006, a woman's refusal to deliver by
c-section was cited by a court that removed the child from her
custody. 20 5 There were other plausible reasons to find that the child
was in danger-the hospital requested an emergency psychiatric
consultation to assess her ability to consent to medical
treatment 206-but as Jessica Waters pointed out, the court's "explicit
reliance on a woman's refusal to consent to a c-section as a basis for
a child neglect finding was never directly addressed by a higher
court," and thus never questioned or challenged. 207
In all of these examples, the autonomy and choices of the
pregnant woman are rejected. At heart, such rejections are
motivated by a sense that the woman is being selfish and that her
priorities are in the wrong order. For example, one commentator
explained in reference to compelled c-sections that "[a] woman's
interest in an aesthetically pleasing or emotionally satisfying birth
should not be satisfied at the expense of the child's safety." 208
Pregnant women are portrayed as irrational for not immediately
deferring to medical expertise and behaving accordingly. 209
This is not to say that all state interventions based upon medical
opinions as to the wellbeing of fetus and mother should be suspectas discussed above, the diagnosis of Jessie Mae Jefferson's complete
placenta previa indicated severe danger. But many other examples
indicate much lower risks, yet courts are often willing to completely
defer to a single doctor's judgment while minimizing or disregarding
the significance of the woman's preferences. Her agency is viewed by
such courts as completely eliminated in favor of the fetus, or the
fetus's interests as expressed by a single physician. Such a
calculation is too simplistic.
Thus far, the rules of maternity have focused on pregnant
women; what choices they make and how those choices should be
guided. The next rule looks after birth, and tells mothers that they

section had taken place).
205. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. V.M., 974 A.2d 448 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2009) (per curiam).
206. Jessica L. Waters, In Whose Best Interest? New Jersey Division of Youth
and Family Services v. V.M. and B.G. and the Next Wave of Court-Controlled
Pregnancies,34 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 81, 85 (2011).

207. Id. at 82.
208. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy, and Childbirth,69 VA. L. REV. 405, 453 (1983).
209. See Marguerite A. Driessen, Avoiding the Melissa Rowland Dilemma: Why
Disobeying A Doctor Should Not Be A Crime, 10 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 1, 32-34
(2006).
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alone are still legally responsible for harms and risks that befall

their child.
IV. RuLE 3: MOTHERS MUST ALWAYS PROTECT
As the previous section discussed, a pregnant woman is expected
to give up decisionmaking power over her own body in favor of the
developing fetus. After she gives birth, the presumption evolves: she
need not scrutinize threats to her body for fear of harming the fetus;
instead her attention should shift to the externalized risks to her
child. She is now responsible not only for her child's care but also for
minimizing and ideally eliminating all the external sources of
potential harm that her child might encounter. If she fails, she may
be legally sanctioned, even if she did not directly hurt her child,
because protection is her job. Melissa Murray describes "the
prioritization of maternity over self-interest" as "at the very heart of
our maternalist culture." 210 Harm to her child means that by
definition she has been a bad mother.
The clearest example of a mother's responsibility to prevent
harm to her child is in the context of abuse, generally abuse by the
mother's romantic partner. Mothers are routinely held responsible
for such abuse, even where the mother is also a victim of abuse or is
otherwise vulnerable. The third rule of maternity tells mothers that
they stand alone as their child's protector, and if they fail-for
whatever reason-they are blameworthy in the eyes of the law.
A. Failureto Protect
In the absence of a special relationship between persons, there is
no generalized duty to rescue. If you see a person in distress or being
victimized as you walk down the street, you are legally free to ignore
them even if you could have helped them. 2 11 If you are a parent,
however, and you see your child in peril, you have a duty to protect
them-and if you do not at least attempt to rescue your child, you
may be prosecuted for that failure. 2 12
This greatly widens the types of action and inaction that give
rise to criminal liability. Most crimes having to do with harm to

210. Melissa Murray, Panopti-Moms, 4 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 165, 174 (2013).
211. See Jennifer M. Collins et. al., Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U. L. REV.
1327, 1335 (2008).
212. See Geneva Brown, When the Bough Breaks: Traumatic Paralysis-An
Affirmative Defense for Battered Mothers, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 189, 232 (2005).
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another person specify a mental state, sometimes an intention, that
must be present in order for the crime to be committed. 213 Suppose
that Cagney strikes Lacey with her car, killing Lacey. If Cagney
hates Lacey and purposefully drove at her in order to kill her, she
committed first-degree murder. If Cagney was drunk and did not see
Lacey until it was too late, she committed manslaughter, or perhaps
second-degree murder if her conduct was particularly reckless. In
both cases the act is the same, but the state must also prove
Cagney's mental state, or mens rea, to convict her of the crime.
If a mother directly causes harm to her child, the state could
likely prosecute her for murder, manslaughter, or child abuse.
Moreover, if another person harmed her child but the mother helped,
the state could still prosecute her for murder or child abuse as an
aider or abettor so long as the state could prove that she had the
required mens rea.214 By contrast, failure-to-protect statutes exist
because of an affirmative duty held by parents to protect their
children from harm. 215 The failure to protect may thus sound in
criminal, civil, or tort law and holds parents responsible for
inaction. 216
Although all states have failure-to-protect laws, and the basic
concept is the same, how the crime is framed varies from one state to
another. Some states use the statute to establish culpability as an
aider and abettor 2 17 or accomplice. 218 Failure to protect as a
freestanding crime is often defined using terms such as "negligence,
2 19
In such
endangerment, abandonment, and condoning of abuse."
instances, being present for the harm, knowing of the harm, or being
in a position that the parent should have known of the harm is
sufficient to demonstrate failure to protect. The vast majority of the

213.

See Michelle S. Jacobs, Requiring Battered Women Die: Murder Liability for

&

Mothers Under Failure to Protect Statutes, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 579, 58687 (1998).
214. See id. at 613.
215. See id. at 586-87.
216. See Sarah Rogerson, Unintended and Unavoidable: The Failure to Protect
Rule and its Consequences for Undocumented Parents and their Children, 50 FAM.
CT. REV. 580, 581 (2012).
217. Whitney Button, What About Failure to Protect: Why Current Homicide
Doctrine Falls Short of Holding Parents Who Fail to Protect Their Children
Accountable, 22 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 693, 697 (2013).
218. Lissa Griffin, "Which One of You Did It?" CriminalLiability for "Causingor
Allowing" the Death of a Child, 15 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 89, 95 (2004).
219. Margo Lindauer, Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: Why MultiCourt-Involved Battered Mothers Just Can't Win, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y
L. 797, 804-05 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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time, the harm in question is domestic violence committed by
another family member or sexual partner at the child. 220
In theory, failure-to-protect statutes are neutral in that the
statute applies to all parents, and represents a normative and policy
statement that this article does not challenge: the relationship
between parent and child is fundamentally different than the
relationship between two strangers, and just as a parent has a duty
to support his or her child, a parent cannot sit idly by while another
person harms the child. In practice, however, failing to protect is
really the mother's failure to protect her child. One dimension is
descriptively literal: failure-to-protect laws are applied almost
exclusively to mothers, reflecting the strength of a perception that it
is mothers, not fathers, who must minimize risks to their children. 221
Second, failure-to-protect laws are applied against vulnerable
women with little sympathy for context-specific reasons why a
battered or immigrant mother might not prevent harm in the way
that a prosecutor or judge would.
In the most straightforward sense, failure-to-protect laws are
drafted as gender-neutral, yet applied only against mothers. Some
discrepancy might be explained by the higher rates of custodial
mothers as opposed to custodial fathers, but not the almost complete
absence of fathers charged with a failure to protect their child.222
This is particularly true given statistics that indicate that
perpetrators of child abuse are more likely to be women than men:
by raw numbers alone, parents witnessing abuse by their co-parent,
and thus in the position to be charged with failure to protect, are
fathers, and not mothers. 223 Jeanne Fugate chronicled one advocate
with sixteen years of experience, summarizing that "I have never
seen a father charged with failure to protect when the mom is the
abuser. Yet, in virtually every case where Dad is the abuser, we
charge Mom with failure to protect." 224 One judge explained his
expectations as to an abused mother's conduct with vague references
to natural instinct:

&

220. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUM. SRvs., ADMIN, FOR CHILDREN
FAMILIES, ADMINISTRATION ON CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND FAMILIES, CHILDREN'S
BUREAU,
CHILD
MALTREATMENT
2014
65
(2016),
available
at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2014.pdf.
221. See Mary E. Becker, Double Binds Facing Mothers in Abusive Families:
Social Support Systems, Custody Outcomes, and Liability for Acts of Others, 2 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 13, 15 (1995).
222. Collins et. al., supra note 211, at 1378.
223. Child Maltreatment 2014, supra note 220, at 71.
224. Jeanne A. Fugate, Who's Failing Whom? A Critical Look at Failure-toProtect Laws, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 272, 274 (2001).
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[T]he Court finds that even animals protect their young....
Now, [the defendant] may have well been afraid of her
husband. There were times when he was gone and even if
she was afraid if she had the natural maternal instinct that
any mother should have, that maternal instinct should have
overcome her fear if she is to be a fit mother and she failed to
do that.2 2 5
With such freighted expectations, any mother might be found
guilty of failing to protect her child, no matter whether she herself
was also victimized or was faced with difficult choices comparing the
risks of different actions. By her presence alone, she is responsible
for any harm coming to her child. 22 6 Such mothers can receive the
same sentence as the person who actively harmed the child, and
often do. 227 Michelle Jacobs summarized others' judgment of the
mother: "A 'good' mother would never find herself in a situation
where she was being abused, and even if she did, she would never
'allow' her children to be abused." 22 8
B. Failureto Protect Both Yourself and Your Child
It is abused mothers who face some of the most problematic
applications of failure to protect cases. In about half of abuse cases
involving child protective services, violence is directed at both
mother and child. 2 29 The federal government knows this-the 2010
reauthorization of the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, a
major piece of legislation affecting how states combat child abuse,

225. Tenn. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Tate, No. 01-A-01-9409-CV-00444, 1995 WL
138858 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1995), quoted in Fugate, supra note 221, at 291.
226. See Brown, supra note 209, at 220.
227. Linda J. Panko, Legal Backlash: The Expanding Liability of Women Who
Fail to Protect Their Children from Their Male Partner's Abuse, 6 HASTINGS
WOMEN'S L.J. 67, 78-79 (1995).
228. Jacobs, supra note 210, at 599.
229. Evan Stark, A Failure to Protect: Unravelling "The Battered Mother's
Dilemma", 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 29, 35 (2000); see also Alex Campbell, Battered,
Bereaved, and Behind Bars, BuzzFeed.com, Oct. 2, 2014, ("[L]ooking back over the
past decade, BuzzFeed News identified 28 mothers in 11 states sentenced to at least
10 years in prison for failing to prevent their partners from harming their children.
In every one of these cases, there was evidence the mother herself had been battered
by the man.").
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made a similar finding that if either child abuse or domestic violence
occurs in a home, over half the time both will be present. 230
Even where the domestic violence is solely directed at the
mother, she could still be convicted of failure to protect her child
from exposure to violence. 23 1 The reasoning is that witnessing
domestic violence harms children. 232 Studies have indicated
behavioral, emotional, and cognitive problems are more common
among children who have been exposed to domestic violence, and
that the cumulative effect is magnified if the child is both a victim of
domestic violence and a witness to violence against other family
members. 233 Other studies, however, cast doubt upon these
conclusions, particularly if the study attempts to control for other
correlative factors such as poverty, age, and race. 234

In either case, whether the child witnesses domestic violence
against his mother or is also a victim of violence himself, the logic
perpetuated by the law is that the mother should leave her abuser
and use whatever means necessary to prevent further contact
between the abuser and her child. As many commentators have
pointed out, this is an unrealistic expectation. Victims of abuse are
often isolated from family and friends and lack financial resources to
leave. 235 Attempting to leave an abusive partner triggers an increase

in the chances of violence, meaning that in order to leave, the
mother is risking greater harm to herself and her child. 2 3 6 Michelle
Jacobs criticizes failure to protect laws for treating "women as
autonomous actors unaffected by the interaction of power and
control, domination and subordination, in the battering relationship,
and therefore view[ing] them as completely capable of saving their
children. Such a view ignores the complexity of mothers who are
both victims and agents."2 37 Finally, to the extent that punitive laws
are meant to deter conduct, it seems questionable to assume that a
victim of domestic violence would find her own legal liability the

230. Myrna S. Raeder, Preserving Family Ties for Domestic Violence Survivors
and Their Children by Invoking A Human Rights Approach to Avoid the
Criminalizationof Mothers Based on the Acts and Accusations of Their Batterers, 17
J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 105, 111 (2014).

231. See Lindauer, supra note 216, at 804-05.
232. See Justine A. Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like A Motherless Child: The Error
of Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565, 570-71
(2004).
233. Id. at 571.
234. Raeder, supra note 227, at 126-27.
235. See Lindauer, supra note 216, at 798-99.
236. See Dunlap, supra note 229232, at 573.
237. Jacobs, supra note 210, at 603.
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238
If
turning point in a decision of whether to stay with her abuser.
such a mother is aware of failure to protect laws, they may in fact
deter her from seeking legal help-if the abuse has been going on for
some time, she is already guilty of failing to protect her children, and
thus might predict that bringing her abuse to the attention of law
enforcement will result in the state taking her child away from

her.

239

Advocates for abused mothers charged with failure to protect
their child from their abuser have used Lenore Walker's description
of "battered woman's syndrome," often now described as "battering
and its effects," to argue why their client should not be held
responsible for preventing her child's abuse. 240 Battered woman's
syndrome describes a cluster of characteristics often found in victims
of domestic violence, including that they believe themselves to be
responsible in some way for their abuse and they do not seek help to
end the abuse. 241The theory in an individual case is that the mother
was incapable of protecting her child, either because the abuse
against her was so violent that she was prevented from doing so, or
because she was emotionally and psychologically disabled by
battered woman's syndrome or a similar issue such as posttraumatic stress disorder. 242 Such defenses have been successful, but
depend upon characterizing the mother as devoid of agency, and as
one scholar described, the defenses "reinforcel negative stereotypes
2
about women's passivity and weakness." 43

Another explanation, known as the "active survivor" theory,
counters that victims of domestic violence respond, not with
helplessness, but with attempts to protect themselves and their
families. 2 44 This view posits that such attempts have been
unsuccessful, so the women try different strategies to minimize or
otherwise reduce the abuse. 245 Their strategies, however, can look to

238. See Fugate, supra note 221, at 290.
239. See Dunlap, supra note 229, at 573-74.
240. See generally LENORE E. WALKER ET. AL, THE BATTERED WOMAN
SYNDROME (1979).
241. Brown, supra note 209, at 198.
242. Id.
243. Fugate, supra note 221, at 280; see also Marina Angel, The Myth of the
Battered Woman Syndrome, 24 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 301 (2015).
244. Kit Kinports, So Much Activity, So Little Change: A Reply to the Critics of
Battered Women's Self-Defense, 23 ST. LOuiS U. PUB. L. REV. 155, 175-76 (2004).
245. See Christine A. Littleton, Women's Experience and the Problem of
Transition:Perspectives on Male Battering of Women, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 23, 4142 (citing LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME, xi (1979)).
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an outside observer as failing to take sufficient steps to leave their
abuser outright. 246
Both a theory of battering and its effects, as well as the active
survivor theory, therefore, are vulnerable to a criticism that the
victim has not done enough to end the violence. Moreover, when the
violence targets both mother and child, such defenses do little to
counteract the underlying expectation that any good mother's
maternal instinct will "overcome her fear." 247

A more promising approach came in the context of a challenge to
child maltreatment proceedings, rather than criminal prosecutions
of mothers who failed to protect their children from abuse. As
discussed previously in the context of drug use by pregnant women,
the same event can generate both criminal prosecution and civil
proceedings alleging that a parent is unfit and removing the child
from the home. 24 8 The New York City Administration for Children
Services (ACS) had begun using failure to protect proceedings in the
civil context to justify removing children from the home based on the
abused mother's failure to protect children from exposure to
domestic violence. 249 A class action suit argued that such
proceedings violated the due process rights of both mothers and
children. 250 At the end of a complicated procedural history, certifying
questions from the Second Circuit to the New York Court of Appeals,
the state supreme court held that exposure to domestic violence
alone, without harm or imminent harm to the child due to the
parent's failure to exercise a minimum required level of care, was
not neglect and did not justify ACS removing children into state
custody. 25 1 The court's holding thus placed a limit on how far a
failure to protect law could reach, but only for civil cases in New
York. Nonetheless, the court's analysis that the level of harm
necessary to justify removal of a child must be more direct and clear
than merely witnessing domestic violence could be imported into
criminal proceedings as well. Other courts, however, have not been
persuaded by similar logic, and exposure to domestic violence is still

246.

Id.

247. Tenn. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Tate, No. 01-A-01-9409-CV-00444, 1995 WL
138858, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1995).
248. Fentiman, supra note 97, at 581-82.
249. See Dunlap, supra note 229, at 593-95.
250. Nicholson v. Williams, 203 F. Supp. 2d 153, 171-72 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding
state policy unconstitutional), questions certified sub nom., Nicholson v. Scoppetta,
344 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2003), certified question answered by Nicholson v. Scoppetta,
820 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2004).
251. See generally id.
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C. Failureto Protect and Immigration
Another vulnerable group affected by failure to protect charges is
undocumented immigrants. Sarah Rogerson recently chronicled the
multiple catch-22s faced by such women, writing that "immigration
law and policy creates disincentives for parents of immigrant
children to act and then punishes them if they do, obscuring the
normative guideposts of both immigration and family law." 2 5 3
Undocumented immigrant women know that interaction with law
enforcement may expose their lack of legal status, and thus, hesitate
to call the police or otherwise seek help from the state in separating
their child from an abuser. Rogerson chronicles one such woman,
Lucia Medina Martinez, who discovered that her husband had
sexually assaulted her daughter. 254 Unsure of what to do, she
initially kicked her husband out of their home, then on her priest's
advice allowed him to return home for three weeks. 255 After further
deliberation and counseling during that time, she reported her
husband, who was later convicted of child molestation. 256 Martinez
was then charged with neglect, based on the theory that she had
failed to protect her daughter, and entered a plea of no contest,
apparently believing a swift resolution would be best. 2 5 7 She did not
know that being found guilty of failure to protect her child made her
statutorily ineligible for relief from immigration proceedings, which
typically resulted in deportation of the undocumented immigrant
parent.2 58 After the Eleventh Circuit wrote a frustrated opinion
explaining that its hands were tied by her ineligibility for relief,
Martinez was the beneficiary of prosecutorial discretion that halted
259
her deportation proceedings.
It is not the aim of this criticism to imply that failure to protect
should not exist as a criminal prohibition, nor that every prosecution
for failure to protect one's child is unfair. It is clear, however, that

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

See Rogerson, supra note 213, at 583.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 580-81.
Her husband did not abuse her daughter during these three weeks.
Id. at 580.

257.

Id.

258.

Id. at 581.

259.

Id.

Id.
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prosecutions for failure to protect are directed almost solely against
mothers, and are pursued largely without serious consideration of
the context in which individual mothers operate. The third rule of
maternity thus demonstrates the insidious problem with the
regulation of mothers, as so many of the regulations operate in a
gray area. Parents should be held responsible for harm to their
children, but in a gender-neutral manner and in a context-specific
way.
V. RuLE 4: GOOD MOTHERHOOD IS A NARROW ROAD
Few decisions about parenting are black and white. Respective
parenting philosophies take very different approaches to the best
way to raise a child, and mothers are often stymied by choosing
which approach is best for their family. In many different arenas,
however, mothers are sanctioned for decisions on either side of the
coin. The fourth rule of maternity effectively tells mothers they
cannot win: Breast is best, unless you are at work, or in public, or
the child is older than a judge, or a bystander believes it is
inappropriate. You should be an advocate for a child facing health
problems, but not too zealous of an advocate. You should teach your
children independence, but not too much independence. Mothers
cannot win.
A. The Importance and Dangerof Breastfeeding
At present, there is a general consensus that breastfeeding offers
benefits that formula feeding does not, and so new mothers are
advised to breastfeed for at least six months if possible. 260 Both
federal and state governments have taken some steps to attempt to
support and encourage breastfeeding-and yet, mothers who must
return to work have little legal protection for attempts to pump

260. See Saru M. Matambanadzo, The Fourth Trimester, 48 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 117, 139 (2014). See also Andrea Freeman, "FirstFood" Justice: Racial
Disparitiesin Infant Feeding as Food Oppression, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3053, 3061
(2015) (contrasting breast milk and formula); Corey Silberstein Shdaimah, Why
Breastfeeding is (Also) a Legal Issue, 10 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 409, 410-11 (1999).
But see Linda C. Fentiman, Marketing Mothers' Milk: The Commodification of
Breastfeeding and the New Markets for Breast Milk and Infant Formula, 10 NEV. L.J.
29, 46-49 (2009) ("In sum, the evidence supporting the marketing of breastfeeding to
women as behavior that is good for them, as well as beneficial to their babies, is far
weaker than acknowledged by the Academy, HHS's National Breastfeeding
Campaign, or the popular press.") [hereinafter Fentiman, Marketing Mothers'Milk].
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breastmilk while at work. 261 Low income mothers are told as a
formal matter that breast is best, but are then given vouchers for
formula. 262 Women are encouraged by some government agencies to
breastfeed, and told they may do so wherever they choose, but then
face stigma and even legal sanction if they nurse in the wrong
location or for too long. 263

A number of state measures, at various levels of government,
ostensibly promote breastfeeding. In 1990, the United States signed
on to a joint policy statement by the World Health Organization and
UN Children's Fund called the Innocenti Declaration on the
Protection, Promotion and Support of Breastfeeding, which
committed governments to protecting the ability of working mothers
to breastfeed. 264 Two years later, Congress included a breastfeeding
promotion program in amendments to the Child Nutrition Act. 2 6 5
The Department of Health and Human Services established a
United States Breastfeeding Committee charged with "working
collaboratively to protect, promote, and support breastfeeding." 266
More recently, the Affordable Care Act included amendments to the
Fair Labor Standards Act that require employers to provide space
and time for employees to pump breast milk, 2 6 7 although employers
with fewer than fifty employees are exempt from such mandates if
they would impose an "undue hardship." 268 At the state level, almost
every state has a statute specifically allowing mothers to breastfeed
their children anywhere that they have a legal right to be. 2 6 9 A few

261. See Kim Diana Connolly, The Ecology of Breastfeeding, 12 SE. ENVTL. L.J.
167, 166-68 (2005).
262. See infra notes 291-292 and accompanying text.
263. See Heather M. Kolinsky, Respecting Working Mothers with Infant

Children: The Need for Increased Federal Intervention to Develop, Protect, and
Support a Breastfeeding Culture in the United States, 17 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y
333, 351-59 (2010) (outlining differing statutory protections or lack therof at a state
level for breastfeeding women).
264. Id. at 342.
265. Id. at 343.
266. Id. at 343-44 (detailing the Committee's report on the economic benefits of
breastkeeping).
267. See Marcy Karin & Robin Runge, Breastfeeding and a New Type of
Employment Law, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 329, 344 (2014).
268. Matambanadzo, supra note 257, at 155. See also Karin & Runge, supra note
263, at 344-52; Sarah Andrews, Lactation Breaks in the Workplace: What Employers
Need to Know About the Nursing Mothers Amendment to the FLSA, 30 HOFSTRA LAB.
& EMP. L.J. 121, 126-42 (2012) (discussing the elements of the Nursing Mothers
Amendment to the FLSA).
269. Kolinsky, supra note 259, at 334.
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states also prohibit interfering with a mother breastfeeding in a
public area. 270
Legal support for breastfeeding, however, is largely contained to
symbolic statements and bland encouragement-rather than
affirmative legal protections. Despite state laws protecting the right
of breastfeeding mothers to nurse in public, women are routinely
told to stop breastfeeding or leave. 27 1 One woman breastfeedmig her
child on an airplane as it prepared for takeoff-a common strategy to
prevent babies from crying as the pressure changes hurt their earswas removed from the flight by flight attendants. 272 Women also face
social stigmatization, as a mother discovered after a man at T.G.I.
Friday's was so offended by her breastfeeding that he took a photo of
her and her baby and posted it on Facebook captioned "I understand
feeding in public but could you at least cover your boob up?!" 2 7 3
Although the Affordable Care Act provisions are better than the
previous complete lack of support for working mothers trying to
continue breastfeeding their children, the improvement is marginal
at best. 27 4 In her recent book Lactivism, Courtney Jung points out
that current support for breastfeeding at work is actually not
support for breastfeeding at all:
Most of these campaigns have been launched with great
fanfare and publicity, and they have been lauded as
supportive of breastfeeding and women. But, without even
acknowledging this important shift from breast to pump,
they have radically redefined what breastfeeding is. To be
clear, pumping at work can help a mother maintain her milk
supply so that she can also nurse her baby at home on
weekends or in the evening. But the government's recent socalled breastfeeding initiatives are designed to help a woman

270. See generally Charity R. Clark & Elizabeth R. Wohl, Breastfeeding Laws in
Vermont: A Primer, VT. B.J., Spring 2008, at 36.
271. See LINDA M. BLUM, AT THE BREAST 127-28 (1999); Silberstein Shdaimah,
supra note 257, at 415.
272. Elizabeth Hildebrand Matherne, The Lactating Angel or Activist? Public
Breastfeeding as Symbolic Speech, 15 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121, 127-28 (2008).
273. Jessica Winter, Breast-Feeding Terror Spreads to Terre Haute, Indiana,
SLATE.COM, (June 1, 2015, 12:12 PM), http://www.slate.comlblogs/xxfactor/
2015/06/01/man_takes creepshot of nursing mother terrorspreadsviasocialmed
ia.html.
274. Emily F. Suski, In One Place, but Not Another: When the Law Encourages
Breastfeeding in Public While Simultaneously Discouraging it at Work, 12 UCLA
WOMEN'S L.J. 109, 112-13 (2001).
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pump breast milk at work so that someone else can feed her
baby breast milk from a bottle. In other words, these muchvaunted initiatives depend upon the unstated-and largely
about
that what is valuable
unstudied-premise
breastfeeding is the chemical composition of human milk,
not the mother-child contact that goes along with feeding a
baby at the breast.275
Furthermore, although mothers are in theory entitled to a
private area and time to pump, in practice the picture is often
different. The time that women spend pumping breastmilk is
unpaid, meaning that women paid by the hour must either decrease
their salary or work longer hours to make up for time spent
pumping. 276 Employers regularly provide rooms ill-suited to
pumping-Jung chronicled employers directing nursing mothers to
"other peoples' offices, copier rooms, file rooms, broom closets, rooms
277
made almost entirely of glass, and open conference rooms."

For the most part, there is no legal remedy for any employment
issues arising from the needs of nursing mothers. 278 As Heather
Kolinsky summarized, although breastfeeding resembles a disability
in that a breastfeeding mother needs some accommodations at work,
it "resides in a parallel universe" outside of the protection of federal
or state law. 27 9 The new Affordable Care Act accommodations fall
under a penalty provision allowing private claims seeking lost
wages, but violations of the breastfeeding provisions do not result in
the awarding of lost wages. 2 8 0 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act
(PDA) does not protect breastfeeding employees, as courts generally
do not consider breastfeeding "part of pregnancy, childbirth, or a
related medical condition." 28 1 A notable exception is the Fifth
Circuit, which held recently that breastfeeding is a medical condition
related to pregnancy under the PDA and that discrimination on the
basis of an employee's breastfeeding could also constitute sex

275. COURTNEY JUNG, LACTIVISM: How FEMENISTS AND FUNDAMENTALSTS,
HIPPIES AND YUPPIES, AND PHYSICIANS AND POLITICIANS MADE BREASTFEEDING BIG
BUSINESS AND BAD POLICY 127 (2015).
276. Matambanadzo, supra note 257, at 155. See also Karin & Runge, supra note
263, at 344-52 (discussing aspects of the Fair Labor Standards Act); Andrews, supra
note 264, at 126-42 (examining the Nursing Mothers Amendment).
277. JUNG, supra note 271, at 136-37.
278. See id. at 140-41.
279. Kolinsky, supra note 259.
280. See Karin & Runge, supra note 263, at 351.
281. See Matambanadzo, supra note 257, at 140.
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discrimination under Title VII. 2 8 2 Most courts, however, simply ask
women who lack a private office and cannot control their own work
schedule to choose between breastfeeding their child and continuing
their employment. 283 Jung criticized the legal requirements as
set[ting] up a whole new set of social expectations and norms
for new mothers by creating the impression that they can,
and should, pump at work. But mothers routinely find
themselves unable to comply with those expectations both
because of obstacles in the workplace and the government's
failure to enforce the regulation. 284
It also remains an open legal question whether teenagers who
give birth while in high school can breastfeed their babies at school.
A Delaware high school told one mother that if she wished to
breastfeed during school hours, she had to transfer to an alternative
Delaware Adolescent Pregnancy Initiative school exclusively for
mothers. 285 After public outcry, the principal relented but "no
consensus emerged on which source of law might apply regarding
the issue." 286

Even well-intentioned programs that aim to directly encourage
breastfeeding have used coercive and even punitive measures. Jung
argues that promoting breastfeeding under the auspices of public
health "place[s] formula feeding alongside other irresponsible
lifestyle choices that are overburdening the US health-care system-

282. See EEOC v. Houston Funding II, Ltd., 717 F.3d 425, 428-30 (5th Cir.
2013). See also Dike v. Sch. Bd., 650 F.2d 783, 784 (5th Cir. 1981) (reversing
dismissal of a teacher's lawsuit against her employer alleging that the School Board
and Superintendent had interfered with her constitutional right to breastfeed her
child). But see Thomas H. Limbrick, Lactation Intolerance: Trivializing the Struggles

of Working Mothers & the Need for a More Diverse Judiciary., 80 MO. L. REV. 1189
(2015) (discussing Eighth Circuit case rejecting a constructive discharge claim
brought by a new mother citing, among other things, the unavailability of a room to
pump breast milk on the day of her resignation).
283 .Fentiman, Marketing Mothers' Milk, supra note 257, at 57
("Unsurprisingly, women at higher paying, usually professional, jobs are more likely
to have the flexibility and privacy necessary to pump, while women at lower status
jobs are often unable to take a break to pump their milk or to have private space in
which to do so.").
284. JUNG, supra note 271, at 143.
285. See Kimberly Jacobsen, They Can Pump Up the Volume but Can They
Pump Out Their Milk? Public Secondary Schools Should Be Required to
Accommodate Lactating Students, 13 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 179, 181 (2014).
286. Id. at 182.
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just like unsafe sex, smoking, and unhealthy eating."2 8 7 In 2012,
New York City began a campaign called "Latch On NYC." 2 88 It had
become common in hospitals for nurses to offer new mothers
formula, which policymakers believed encouraged mothers to give up
efforts to breastfeed too early. 289 The "Latch On NYC" response,
however, was to treat formula as though it were a prescription
medication, directing nurses to encourage breastfeeding, only give a
mother formula if she insisted and only provide enough for a single
feeding, and to note any use of formula in her baby's medical
chart.290 Coercive pressure in one direction by hospital staff was
replaced with legally mandated coercive pressure in the opposite
direction.
State regulation of low-income women is even more direct, due to
their greater interactions with state agencies. The Special
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children
(WIC) provides vouchers for food beginning during pregnancy and
lasting until a child turns five years old. On the one hand, WIC
recipients can receive vouchers for formula, which some advocates
29
criticize as promoting formula over breast milk. 1 On the other
hand, as of 2009, mothers who breastfeed their children are eligible
for more and better food vouchers, provided as an explicit reward for
women who choose to breastfeed. 292 Economic pressures, however,
operate against breastfeeding as well. Women in lower status and
lower-paid jobs are less likely to have enough control over their own

287. JUNG, supra note 271, at 123.
288. See NYC Health, Latch on NYC (2016), https://wwwl.nyc.gov/site/doh/
healthlhealth-topics/breastfeeding-latch-on.page; Thomas Farley, N.Y. City Dep't of
Health & Hygience, Latch on NYC (2012), https://wwwl.nyc.gov/assets/doh
/downloads/pdf/ms/initiative-description.pdf
289. N.Y. City Dep't of Health & Hygience, Latch on NYC.
290. JUNG, supra note 271, at 107.
291. See Silberstein Shdaimah, supra note 257, at 433 ("It is difficult to combat
the mixed message that WIC patrons receive, especially when WIC also meets the
needs of women who choose not to breastfeed. More advertising, promotion,
educational programs and videos, particularly directed to WIC participants, would go
far in conveying unambiguous encouragement of breastfeeding."); see also BLUM,
supra note 267, at 143; Karin & Runge, supra note 263, at 333 ("In fiscal year 2009,
WIC spent $850 million to provide this formula.").
292. JUNG, supra note 271, at 111-12. As Jung points out, this reward is
particularly perverse if one believes that breast milk is better for babies than
formula, as it gives less nutritious food to the children suffering the ostensibly
substandard formula feeding. See also BLUM, supra note 267, at 139-40 (describing
WIC programs in the 1990s giving mothers "t-shirts, infant car seats, and other
gifts" as rewards for breastfeeding).

416

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84.367

schedule to accommodate pumping at work. Lower-income women
are also more likely to be paid by the hour, meaning that time spent
pumping is money directly out of their pockets: if a mother spends a
total of one hour taking breaks at work to pump, she is not paid for
that hour, yet likely still has to pay a daycare or other childcare
provider for that time. 2 9 3 Andrea Freeman recently wrote critically of
policymakers' lack of awareness of such pressures, arguing that
the power of the myth of black women as bad mothers that
fosters indifference to structural factors that impede black
women's ability to breastfeed successfully . . . supports the
formula industry's project of increasing profits by enlisting
the government to promote formula feeding through a policy
framework that causes disparate harm to black women. 294
Unsurprisingly, the rate of breastfeeding is significantly higher
among older, wealthier, and white women as compared to younger,
lower-income, and nonwhite mothers. 295
Family law similarly offers little support for nursing mothers.
Where courts are faced with a custody dispute between a
breastfeeding mother and the infant's father, Kristen Hofheimer
summarizes the dominant approach as "the court salutes the
superiority of breastfeeding, but then proceeds to make a custody or
visitation order that significantly curtails the breastfeeding
relationship." 296 At least one court directly ordered a mother to "stop
breast feeding the children, if necessary, in order to comply with the
visitation order." 297
If the biological and employment stars have aligned to allow a
mother to breastfeed her child for an extended period, some courts
have viewed extended breastfeeding as a reason to award custody to

293.
294.

See Karin & Runge, supra note 263, at 335--36.
Freeman, supra note 257, at 3057; see also Melissa L. Breger,

The

(in)visibility of Motherhood in Family Court Proceedings, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 555, 579-87 (2012) (giving fuller background to T.C., discussed in
Freeman's article, charged with manslaughter after her breastfed daughter died at
six weeks).
295. See Karin & Runge, supra note 263, at 335-36.
296. Kristen D. Hofheimer, Breastfeeding As A Factor in Child Custody and
Visitation Decisions, 5 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 433, 458 (1998); see also Breger, supra
note 294, at 579-87; Isabelle Schallreuter Olson, Out of the Mouths of Babes: No
Mother's Milk for U.S. Children the Law and Breastfeeding, 19 HAMLINE L. REV. 269,
297-98 (1995).
297. Bowen v. Thomas, 656 N.E.2d 1328, 1330 (1995).
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the other parent, criticizing the mother for breastfeeding "beyond
2 98
the time when the judge feels the child should have been weaned."
Preferences and practices regarding extended breastfeeding vary,
but many doctors recommend that breastfeeding continue for at
least one year, and evidence exists to support breastfeeding as
beneficial for as long as a child and mother choose. 299 Despite this,
extended breastfeeding is often regarded as cause for suspicion of
maltreatment. 300 For example, a South Dakota judge awarded
custody to a one-year-old child's father based in part at the mother's
30 1
An Oregon
"insistence on breast feeding [the child] indefinitely."
trial court judge described a mother's continued breastfeeding of her
nineteen-month-old daughter as "a further example of her singleminded eagerness to pursue her own interests irrespective of their
impact on the child and [the father]."302
If a mother engages in extended breastfeeding, it may even
become the basis of a child abuse charge. 303 An attorney involved
with La Leche League chronicled a number of anecdotes of such
cases, with mothers charged with abuse for nursing children
between the ages of three and six. 304 In Illinois, a babysitter called
an abuse hotline to report that her six-year-old charge told her that
he didn't want to breastfeed any more.3 05 Even though the mother
said he had never told her he wanted to wean, and that her plan was
to stop nursing based on his preferences, the boy was taken from his
30
home and placed in foster care for five months. 6

298. Hofheimer, supra note 292, at 453.
299. Id. at 455-56.
300. In the 1990s, a single mother nursing her two and a half year old daughter
attempted to contact a representative from the breastfeeding support organization
La Leche League because she was disturbed by feeling a sensation of sexual arousal
during breastfeeding. She was instead connected to a rape crisis center, who reported
her to the police, who arrested her and placed her daughter in foster care for almost
one year. See BLUM, supra note 267, at 96.
301. Friendshuh v. Headlough, 504 N.W.2d 104 (S.D. 1993). See also Shunk v.
Walker, 589 A.2d 1303, 1305 (1991).
302. In re Marriage of Holcomb, 888 P.2d 1046, 1047-48 (Or. Ct. App. 1995).
303. See Elizabeth N. Baldwin, Extended Breastfeeding and the Law, LA LECHE
2007),
14,
Oct.
updated
(last
INTERNATIONAL
LEAGUE
originally published in MOTHERING
http://www.111i.org/law/lawextended.html;
MAGAZINE, Mar. 22, 1993 (Issue 66), availableat Westlaw (1993 WLNR 5018817).
304. Id.
305. Sue Ellen Christian & Julie Deardorff Woman Charged with Abuse for
Breastfeeding Son, 6, OTTAWA CITIZEN, Dec. 11, 2000, at A14.
306. Julie Deardorff, Breastfeeding Case Ends as Mom Regains Custody, CHI.
TRIBUNE, Feb. 1, 2001, available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2001-02-
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Mothers who nurse past the infant stage also face intense social
scrutiny and criticism. Tamar Lewin summed up the paradox in The
New York Times: "[The same mothers who got kudos from their
pediatricians and warm smiles from strangers when they nursed
their newborn babies face criticism-and sometimes even formal
charges of abuse-for continuing to breast-feed when that sweetly
cooing infant becomes a walking, talking schoolchild."30 7 Courtney
Jung chronicled several stories of mothers participating in WIC who
were frustrated by heavy-handed pressure to breastfeed, yet at least
one mother she spoke with was then criticized by a WIC employee
for breastfeeding longer than one year. 308 In 2012, Time magazine
sparked an uproar when it placed on the cover a photograph of
Jamie Lynne Grumet breastfeeding her three-year-old son.30 9 One

poll by the Today show found almost three quarters of respondents
"really did not want to see it."310 One commentator wrote there was
"something profoundly disturbing, even narcissistic, about what
Grumet is doing." 3 1 1 Another asked, "will the cover's shocking - and
disturbingly sexy - depiction help or hurt the push to make
breastfeeding more publicly acceptable?" 312 (It is unclear what made
the cover "disturbingly sexy" other than the partially-visible breast
and the fact that Grumet is conventionally attractive.) Extended
breastfeeding disturbed the city council of Forest Park, a suburb of
Atlanta, so much that in 2011 it voted to legally prohibit

01/news/0102010210_1einhorn-mother-and-child-breastfeeding;

Court

Case

Questions Extended Breastfeeding, MOTHERING MAGAZINE, Mar. 1, 2001, at 31.
307. Tamar Lewin, The Nation: Mother's Milk; Breastfeeding-How Old Is Too
Old?,
N.Y. TImES
(Feb.
18,
2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/18/
weekinreview/the-nation-mother-s-milk-breast-feeding-how-old-is-too-old.html.
308. JUNG, supra note 271, at 114-15.
309. Feifei Sun, Behind the Cover: Are You Mom Enough?, TIME (May 10, 2012),
http://time.com/3450144/behind-the-cover-are-you-mom-enough/.
310. Patricia Reaney & Christine Kearney, Time Cover Mother Defends Extended
Breastfeeding, REUTERS (May 11, 2012, 2:14 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ustime-breastfeeding-idUSBRE84AOSG20120511.
311. Luisa D'Amato, Time Magazine's Breastfeeding Mom Should Have Put
Son's

Interests

First,

WATERLOO

REGION

RECORD

(May

12,

2012),

http://www.therecord.com/opinion-story/2602280-d-amato-time-magazine-sbreastfeeding-mom-should-have-put-son-s-interests-first/.
312. Janice D'Arcy, Time Cover of Breastfeeding Mom Issues a Challenge to
Those
Who
Support
Nursing,
WASH.
POST
(May
11,
2012),
https://www.washingtonpost.comlblogs/on-parenting/post/time-cover-ofbreastfeeding-mom-issues-a-challenge-to-those-who-supportnursing/2012/05/10/gIQAZowOGU-blog.html?utmterm=.6859b44cec8.
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breastfeeding a child older than two years old in public.313 After
public protest, the council backed down and repealed the
prohibition. 314
Mothers are thus confronted with a series of paradoxical
messages immediately after they give birth. Breastfeed exclusively
for at least six months-unless you have to go back to work, in which
case your employer will dictate your ability to pump at work.
Continue breastfeeding for at least one year, unless you and a
coparent fight over custody, in which case a judge may make it
impossible for practical purposes to continue breastfeeding or view
your choice to breastfeed as selfish and a reason to grant custody to
the other parent. Feel free to breastfeed in public, although you may
face public scrutiny and condemnation. Breast is best, unless your
child resembles a toddler more than a baby, in which case it is
sexual, narcissistic, and possibly abuse.
B. Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy/MedicalAbuse
Munchausen Syndrome, named after a German soldier famous
for his exaggerated stories, describes individuals who seek medical
treatment for nonexistent illnesses, to the point that they invent
medical histories to present to doctors in support of their
maladies. 315 In the late 1970s, a British doctor named Roy Meadow
modified the term to Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy (MSBP) to
describe an attenuated version, in which parents sought medical
316
The
treatment for nonexistent illnesses suffered by their children.
parents involved are overwhelmingly female; one analysis found
fewer than two percent of the parents perpetrating MSBP abuse
3 17
were male.

MSBP is often defined by four key characteristics:
1) The parent fabricates an illness or induces an illness in
the child; 2) The parent repeatedly seeks medical care for the

313. Forest Park Restricts Public Breastfeeding, WSBTV (May 17, 2011),
http://www.wsbtv.com/news/news/forest-park-restricts-public-breast-feeding/nFChb.
314. Angel K. Brooks, Lactivists' Win in Forest Park, ATL. J.-CONST., June 8,
2011, at B2.
315. See Kimberly L. Sweet, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: Treatment in the
Courts, 16 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 89, 90 (2008).

316.

Id. at 90.

317. See Michael T. Flannery, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy: Broadening the
Scope of Child Abuse, 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 1175, 1197 (1994) [hereinafter Flannery,
Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy].
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child's falsified illness, subjecting the child to unnecessary
medical procedures; 3) The parent denies any knowledge as
to the source of the child's illness; [and] 4) The child's
symptoms disappear when the parent is separated from the
child. 318

Where a mother fabricates the illness entirely, she is described
as a "doctor addict," in contrast to "active inducers," who harm their
child in order to present genuine symptoms-although most cases
involve both forms of presenting symptoms.

3 19

MSBP can be difficult

to identify, as for obvious reasons, a worried parent bringing a child
with confusing symptoms to doctors and hospitals doesn't
immediately raise any suspicions. Ocassionally, where doctors or
nurses become suspicious of a parent, video surveillance of a child's
hospital room can catch the parent in the act of inducing symptoms
in their child. 320 Otherwise, MSBP diagnosis is sometimes made by
the process of elimination, either by ruling out increasing numbers
of medical explanations for a child's symptoms, or because a child's
condition improves significantly once the child is in the hospital and
out of the parent's care. 321
There is no doubt that MSBP does exist, and has resulted in the
injury and death of many children. Many of the earliest cases
involved clear evidence of abuse. For example, the first use of MSBP
as an explanation of abuse involved two children adopted from Korea
into the Phillips family in California. Priscilla Phillips and her
husband had two biological sons, and they adopted their daughter
Tia from Korea in November 1975.322 Over a period of about one
year, Priscilla repeatedly rushed Tia to the hospital reporting
vomiting and diarrhea. 323 Each time, doctors found elevated levels of
sodium and bicarbonate in Tia's blood, but could not determine the
cause. 324 Tia died in the hospital in February 1977.325 The Phillips
adopted Mindy, a second girl from Korea, a few months after Tia's
death, and on the second anniversary of Tia's death, Priscilla

318. E. Selene Steelman, A Question of Revenge: Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy and A Proposed Diminished Capacity Defense for Homicidal Mothers, 8

CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 261, 267 (2002).
319. Id. at 268.
320. See id. at 273.
321. Id.
322. People v. Phillips, 175 Cal. Rptr. 703, 705 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
323. Id. at 706.
324. Id. at 706-07.
325. Id. at 707.
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brought Mindy to the hospital with the same symptoms. 32 6 Mindy's
symptoms aroused suspicions in her doctors; since the girls were
adopted, and thus not biologically related, it seemed clear that the
symptoms were caused by something in Mindy's environment, which
made the physicians begin to suspect poisoning. 327 The hospital later
tested formula that Priscilla brought to the hospital to feed to Mindy
and discovered extremely high sodium levels. 328 The hospital then
disposed of the formula, prohibited Priscilla from feeding Mindy, and
only allowed her to visit Mindy when a nurse could also be present,
and Mindy swiftly recovered. 329 Priscilla was later convicted of
willfully endangering the life or health of Mindy and murdering
Tia. 330

Similarly, in September 1981, Mary Beth Davis brought her twomonth-old son Seth to a local hospital, and she reported that he had
suffered a seizure, severe enough that it caused permanent brain
damage. 331 After he received emergency treatment in two different
hospitals, one of Seth's physicians discovered that the seizure was
likely caused by an extremely high level of insulin in his blood,
which the doctor believed could only have been caused by an
injection of insulin. 332 About six months later, Davis brought her
three-year-old daughter Tegan to the same hospital, and Tegan was
vomiting and having pain with urination. 333 Tegan died two days
later, and an autopsy found evidence in her stomach of caffeine
pills. 3 3 4 Davis's husband reported that he had found an empty packet
of caffeine pills in a garbage bag at their home, and Mary Beth was
335
eventually convicted of poisoning Seth and murdering Tegan.
Few cases are as clear-cut as the Phillips's and Davis's, however,
and numbers of MSBP cases are hard to quantify. One scholar found
fewer than one hundred cases citing MSBP between 1981 and
2002.336 Many more cases may have arisen that did not result in
reported cases, with experts estimating somewhere between two

326.

Id.

327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id.
Id. at 708.
Id.
Id. at 705.
State v. Davis, 519 S.E.2d 852, 857 (W. Va. 1999).
Id.
Id.

334. Id. at 858.
335.
336.

Id.
See Steelman, supranote 314, at 263.
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hundred and one thousand diagnoses of MSBP since 1977.337 Other
experts estimate 1,200 cases of MSBP are at least suspected every
year. 3 3 8 A 2008 article stated that "[bly nearly all accounts, instances
of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy are on the rise," flagging that
the medical community in particular has reached consensus that
MSBP cases are increasing. 339 Michigan identifies the number of
allegations of medical child abuse 340 within the larger figures of child
abuse and neglect, averaging fifty one charges each year from 2010
to 2013.341 Extrapolating this to national numbers would result in
over 1,600 charges of medical child abuse per year.3 4 2
The problem is that most MSBP cases are not as strong as the
two examples above. Obviously, direct evidence such as video
surveillance showing a mother harming her child is unambiguous
proof of abuse. 343 In the absence of such dramatic proof, many
diagnoses of MSBP are made through a process of elimination,
where doctors, and later a prosecutor, show that the likely
"reasonable, organic" causes of a child's symptoms were not present,
on the logic that unexplained symptoms were thus caused by the
parent.3 " Another inferential method of identifying MSBP is by
removing the child from the care of her parents and seeing if the

337.

Melissa A. Prentice, ProsecutingMothers Who Maim and Kill: The Profile of

Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy Litigation in the Late 1990s, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 373,
377 (2001).
338. Kathleen R. Miller, Detecting the Undetectable.- An Examination of the
Intersection Between Sudden Infant Death Syndrome and Munchausen by Proxy
Syndrome, 5 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 287, 295 (2006).
339. Sweet, supra note 315, at 89, 91.
340. See explanation below as to the term "medical abuse" replacing MSBP,
infra at 67. [this crossreference isn't updated - it's meant to go to a paragraph
currently on page 69.]
341. Maxine Eichner, The New Child Abuse Panic, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/12/opinion/sunday/the-new-child-abuse-panic.html.
342. See id.
343. It is worth noting, however, that one commentator has pointed out that
video surveillance of a mother suspect of MSBP allows further abuse of the child
while doctors or law enforcement hope to catch the abuse on tape. See Michael T.
Flannery, First, Do No Harm: The Use of Covert Video Surveillance to Detect
Munchausen Syndrome By Proxy-An Unethical Means of "Preventing"Child Abuse,
32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 105, 119 (1998) ("[E]mploying covert video surveillance is
both unnecessary and unethical as a means of proving Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy, despite the sometimes positive results from such efforts, because the process
not only permits child abuse to occur, but also purposely creates an environment
conducive to its perpetration.").
344. Steelman, supra note 314, at 280.
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child improves, the reasoning being that if the child improves out of
her mother's care, then the mother must have been triggering the
symptoms. 34 5 If a child continues to suffer, it proves her mother's

innocence. In a particularly dramatic case, parents sued the New
York Department of Social Services after their daughter was
removed from their home for one year based on the suspicion that
her mother was harming her. 346 During the entire separation, the
mother was not allowed to contact her daughter. 347 After one year, a
family court determined that the daughter's health had not
improved, so she was eventually returned to her parents-who sued
the Department of Social Services. 348 The Department of Social
Services was granted summary judgment against the parents'
lawsuit alleging medical malpractice and false imprisonment. 349
Identification of MSBP is particularly troubling when it
intersects with sudden infant death syndrome, known as SIDS.
SIDS causes the death of about five thousand babies each year,
mostly before they reach the age of six months. 350 Although doctors
have become aware of some correlative factors-SIDS is more
common during both the winter and among African Americans, for
example-it is largely a "diagnosis of exclusion," meaning that
doctors cannot find any other explanation for the baby's death.35 1
Perhaps because of the unclear explanation of SIDS, doctors and
commentators have frequently suggested that up to ten percent of
SIDS deaths are actually undetected homicides, often explained as
mothers smothering their babies. 3 52 Roy Meadow, the physician
mentioned above who coined the term Munchausen Syndrome by
Proxy, believed that multiple SIDS deaths in a single family was de

345. See In re Clarissa M.S., No. 94-2017, 1995 WL 27793, at *2-3 (Wis. Ct. App.
Jan. 24, 1995).
346. See Straton v. Orange County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 628 N.Y.S.2d 818, 819
(N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
347. Id.

348. Id.
349. See id. See also Flannery, supra note 339, at 185.
350. Miller, supra note 338, at 289-90.
351. See id.
352. See id. at 302; Catherine L. Goldenberg, Sudden Infant Death Syndrome as
a Mask for Murder: Investigatingand ProsecutingInfanticide, 28 Sw. U. L. REV. 599,
612 (1999) ("[W]hen a parent with Munchausen suffocates a child and then presents
the child to health care workers for treatment, reporting only that the child suddenly
stopped breathing, the child's death can easily be labeled as SIDS."); see also Miller,
supra note 338, at 291-92.
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facto proof of homicide. 353 As he explained in what came to be known
as "Meadow's law," "[o]ne sudden infant death is a tragedy, two is
suspicious and three is murder until proved otherwise." 354 Meadow's
law, and his own expert testimony about SIDS and MSBP at several
trials, contributed to the murder convictions of several British
women that were later overturned. 355
The most confounding problem of MSBP, however, is that many
of the characteristics used to diagnose and identify MSBP are the
same traits exhibited by devoted and loving mothers presented with
a sick child. Mothers with MSBP are described as "the picture of
loving, doting parents" 35 6 and as a "distortion of the traditional
maternal nurturer." 357 They are "typically cooperative with medical
staff, overzealously involved in the child's care, and medically
knowledgeable." 358 One list of factors associated with MSBP includes
a mother's "unusual degree of attentiveness to child's needs in
hospital" and her "unusually supportive and cooperative attitude
toward doctors and hospital staff."359 Another list of "warning signs"
includes "the individual is friendly and cooperates with the health
care staff and providers; and . . . the individual appears to be
concerned about the patient, and at times may seem overly
concerned."36 0
In recent years, the medical community has moved towards
replacing Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy with the term "medical
child abuse," in an attempt to place the focus on the child as opposed
to the parent.36 1 The logic is that rather than arguing about the
psychological state of a mother at trial, medical child abuse looks to
the child in order to ask whether the child has received unnecessary
medical treatment. 362 In practice, however, looking to whether a

353.

Elaine E. Sutherland, Undue Deference to Experts Syndrome?, 16 IND. INT'L

& COMP. L. REV. 375, 386 (2006).
354. Id.
355. Id. at 378-79.
356. Sweet, supra note 315, at 92.
357. Steelman, supra note 314, at 269.
358. Flannery, Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, supra note 313, at 1189-90.
359. Melinda Cleary, Mothering Under the Microscope: Gender Bias in Law and
Medicine and the Problem of Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, 7 T.M. COOLEY J.
PRAC. & CLINICAL L. 183, 202-03 (2005) (discussing the factors used in In the Matter
of Jessica Z, 515 N.Y.S.2d 370 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1987).
360. Tiffany S. Allison, Note, ProvingMedical Child Abuse: The Time Is Now for
Ohio to Focus on the Victim and Not the Abuser, 25 J.L. & HEALTH 191, 198 (2012).
361. See id. at 202.
362. See id. at 210.

THE RULES OFMATERNITY

2017]

425

child has had excessive medical treatment second-guesses a mother's
care even more. Seeking treatment for a child presenting symptoms
that confound doctors becomes potential medical child abuse, as
testing and treatment in the absence of a diagnosis can be viewed as
a mother subjecting her child to unnecessary procedures.
Professor Maxine Eichner published a searing op-ed in The New
York Times discussing medical child abuse, which she termed "the
new child abuse panic." 36 3 Eichner points out that "what constitutes

'unnecessary medical care'-the heart of the test for medical child
abuse-is vague and subjective. After all, doctors often disagree with
one another when it comes to the diagnosis and treatment of
complicated conditions."3 64 Eichner draws from her own experience
dealing with the puzzling and painful symptoms of her daughter for
eight years before being diagnosed with mitochondrial disease,
known as mito. 3 6 5 She writes that she was lucky not to have been
accused of medical child abuse, comparing her family's struggles to
that of Justina Pelletier, a teenager also diagnosed with mito:
On the advice of a metabolic geneticist at Tufts Medical
Center who was treating her, [Justina] was admitted in 2013
to Boston Children's Hospital, so that she could see her
longtime gastroenterologist, who had recently moved there.
Without consulting the girl's doctor at Tufts, Boston
Children's concluded that the girl's problem was not mito,
but largely psychiatric, according to The Boston Globe....
When her parents disagreed and sought to transfer her back
to Tufts, Boston Children's called child protection, asserting
that the parents were harmfully interfering in her care.
Although the Tufts geneticist supported the mito diagnosis, a
juvenile court judge deferred to Boston Children's
assessment, and Justina's parents lost custody. After more
than 16 months in state custody, much of it spent in a locked
psychiatric ward, Justina was finally returned to her parents
3 66
- still in a wheelchair, still sick.
It is one thing when a mother is caught attempting to feed her
child formula that has been tampered with, or when an autopsy
shows unexplained caffeine pills in the stomach of a young child. It

363.

Eichner, supra note 337.

364. Id.

365. Id.
366.

Id.
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is another problem altogether when the lack of diagnosis, or
disagreements among doctors as to the proper diagnosis, is itself
taken as proof of child abuse. What mother, worried about her sick
child, would not be unusually attentive to her child's needs and
extremely concerned about her child's care? What mother, faced with
a sick child with an extended series of appointments trying to
identify and treat a serious illness, would not try to be supportive
and cooperative with doctors and nurses, as well as become
knowledgeable about her child's symptoms and possible diagnoses?
MSBP and medical child abuse force mothers to walk a careful
tightrope: concern but not too much concern, involvement with a
child's treatment but not too much knowledge about that treatment.
C. Helicopter Versus Free Range Mothering
Mothers also face paradoxical messages regarding their
parenting styles. As discussed above, mothers should minimize risks
to their children-but not too much, lest they be termed "helicopter"
parents. Mothers should foster independence in their children-but
not too much, as it might rise to the level of neglect.
"Helicopter parenting" has become a buzzword, a cautionary tale
of parents who go overboard with supervising, supporting, and
monitoring their children so extensively that the children never
learn independence. Kathleen Vinson chronicled the myriad ways in
which parents err on the side of overprotection:
Helicopter parenting involves various forms of hovering and
can begin before children are born and continue through
graduate school. Helicopter parenting during pregnancy
starts when parents seek increasing amounts of information
regarding achieving the optimal pregnancy and baby. Once
the child is born, it continues as parents try to place children
in a protective bubble or armor, relying on numerous safety
and monitoring devices like "nanny cams"; putting babies in
helmets; using pads on toddlers' knees; and tracking children
with GPS. Parents schedule their child's play dates and
every aspect of their lives. Children have less freedom and
play time today than in the past, as they are involved in an
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increasing number of school and after-school activities where
every child gets a trophy for participating. 67
Faced with such suffocating attention, the theory posits that
children lack decision-making and coping skills that they would
otherwise develop through grappling with problems on their own. 3 6 8
Popular media (and parenting advice) provides much of the focus on
helicopter parents, but Gaia Bernstein and Zvi Triger have written
in recent years about how "intensive parenting," as they term it, is
now actively encouraged by the law. 369 Family law rewards the

amount of time a parent spends with their child, in both making
custody determinations and determining child support awards,
providing parents with incentives to supervise a child every
available minute.37 0 Bernstein and Triger also point to modifications
of the Parental Immunity Doctrine in tort law, and how it allows
more lawsuits against parents for insufficiently protective care and
"the ways in which the law repeatedly incorporates knowledge about
best child rearing practices into legal monitoring duties."3 71
Similarly, another recent article argues that parental responsibility
laws-holding a parent legally responsible for her child's prohibited
behavior-have been enforced disproportionately against mothers as
a punishment for their perceived bad parenting. 372
At the same time, however, too much self-reliance is also a bad
thing. The counterpoint to helicopter parents are the free-range
parents, who "resist these new protective norms, arguing that if kids
are denied an opportunity to develop or demonstrate independence,
they will grow up with a diminished sense of personal responsibility
and self-sufficiency."3 73 Too much independence has led to repeated

367. Kathleen Vinson, Hovering Too Close: The Ramifications of Helicopter
Parentingin Higher Education, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 423, 428-29 (2013) (internal

citations omitted).
368. Id. at 435-36 (analyzing helicopter parenting in the context of higher
education, as students are often unable to "analyze important decisions associated
with the high-school-to-college transition").
369. Bernstein & Triger, supra note 110, at 1226.
370. See id. at 1242-45.
371. Id. at 1248-49.
372. See Portia Allen-Kyle, Women at the Forefront: Laissez-Faire Sexism,
Mother Blaming, and Parental Responsibility Laws, 36 WoMEN's RTs. L. REP. 164
(2015).
373. David Pimentel, Fearing the Bogeyman: How the Legal System's
Overreaction to Perceived Danger Threatens Families and Children, 42 PEPP. L. REV.

235, 238 (2015).
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interactions with law enforcement and child protective services. In
December 2014, Danielle and Alexander Meitiv allowed their
children, ten and six years old, to walk by themselves one mile from
a playground to their home, a route with which the children were
apparently very familiar with. 374 Someone saw the two children

walking, called the police, and the children were brought home in a
police cruiser. 375 Montgomery County Child Protective Services then
began a two-month investigation into whether the Meitivs were
guilty of child neglect. 376 The charge was eventually found to be
unsubstantiated, meaning that although the charge would not be
pursued at that time, CPS would keep a file on the Meitivs open for
five years.3 77
In April 2015, an eleven year old boy arrived home without a
key, apparently because his parents had been delayed by weather
and traffic. 378 While he waited for his parents to arrive with the
house key, which took about ninety minutes, he went into the
backyard and played basketball.3 7 9 A neighbor saw him outside for
what the neighbor considered an extended period of time and called
the police. 380 The parents were arrested for negligence, and the son
was put in foster care with a relative for one month. 381 Although in
both of the above examples, both parents were involved in the
decision and were investigated for neglect, the mothers became
unofficial spokespersons for the family and were the focus of public
outrage and criticism.
In other examples, the mother was investigated alone. In 2007, a
professor at Montana State University was charged with child
endangerment after sending her younger children to the local mall

374. Id. at 263.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Donna St. George, "Unsubstantiated"Child Neglect Finding for Free-Range
Parents, WASHINGTON POST (March 2, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/1ocall
education/decision-in-free-range-case-does-not-end-debate-about-parenting-andsafety/2015/03/02/5a919454-cO4d-1 1e4-ad5c-3b8ce89flb89_story.html.
378. Lenore Skenazy, 11-Year-Old Boy Played in His Yard. CPS Took Him,
Felony Charge for Parents, REASON.COM (June 11, 2015, 11:35 AM),
http://reason.com/blog/2015/06/11/11-year-old-boy-played-in-his-yard-cps-t.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Lenore Skenazy, Trouble Not Over for Florida Parentsof 11-Year-Old Taken
in
CPS
Dispute,
REASON.COM
(June
12,
2015,
10:59
AM),
http://reason.comlblog/2015/06/12/kidnapped-by-the-state-trouble-not-over.
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with her twelve-year-old daughter and the daughter's friend. 382 Both
of the older girls had taken classes in babysitting, but when they left
the younger children-eight, seven, and three years old 383 -outside
dressing rooms as they tried on clothing, store employees called the
police. 3 84 In 2012, a mother in Arkansas told her ten year old son

that because he had been kicked off the school bus due to his bad
behavior for a fifth time, he would have to walk to school. 38 5 She was
convicted of child endangerment.m Similiarly, a mother in Virginia
was subjected to a home visit from Alexandria Child Protective
Services when someone reported that her nine-year-old son was
home alone after he walked home by himself from school, although
his grandmother was actually in the home at the time. 3 8 7 Another
mother was charged with child abuse and neglect when she did not
accompany her six-year-old son and his slightly older brother to wait
for the school bus, and the bus ran over his foot.3 8 8 In such cases,
mothers are judged for not being sufficiently protective of their
children. David Pimentel argues that such prosecutions are "just as
much about enforcing gender roles as protecting children." 389
There has been some legislative movement to protect the
judgment of parents, most recently in the Every Child Succeeds Act.
Although the bulk of the statute focuses on public education, one
section aims to protect parents from liability "for allowing their child
to responsibly and safely travel to and from school by a means the

382. Pimentel, Fearing the Bogeyman, supra note 369, at 260-61; see also
Bridget Kevane, Reflections from the Montana Mall Mother, 2013 UTAH L. REV.
ONLAW 276 (2013).

383. Judith Warner, Dangerous Resentment, N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (July 9,
2009, 9:00 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/09/dont-hate-herbecause-shes-educated/.
384. David Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect and the "Free Range Kid": Is
Overprotective Parentingthe New Standard of Care?, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 947, 968
(2012).
385. Pimental, Fearingthe Bogeyman, supra note 369, at 258.
386. Id.
387. Donna St. George & Brigid Schulte, Montgomery County Neglect Inquiry
Shines Spotlight on 'Tree-Range" Parenting, WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.comlocal/education/montgomery-county-neglect-inquiryshines-spotlight-on-free-range-parenting/2015/01/17/352d4b30-9d99-11e4-bcfb059ec7a93ddc-story.html.
388. Zvi Triger, The Darker Side of Overparenting, 2013 UTAH L. REV. ONLAW
284, 289 (2013).
389.

Pimentel, Criminal Child Neglect, supra note 380, at 990.
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parents believe is age-appropriate." 390 Broader reform, however, does
not seem forthcoming, and mothers remain vulnerable to legal and
social censure for their parenting philosophies.
The rules of maternity enforce gender roles, but also enforce
other proscribed roles, delineated by race, class, criminal status, and
other factors. The final rule of maternity polices the bounds of who
"should," and in some circumstanceswho may, become a mother.
VI. RULE 5: ONLY SOME WOMEN NEED APPLY
In many ways, it seems to modern women that there is a strong
norm encouraging them to become mothers. Attempted restrictions
of access to contraceptives present women with the untenable and
unrealistic choice between abstinence and risk of pregnancy. 39 1 The
federal government has encouraged young women to make choices
with their future reproduction in mind, considering themselves as
pre-pregnant at all times, even if they have no plans to become
mothers. 392 For example, the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention
recently
released
guidelines
and
infographics
recommending that women of childbearing age abstain from alcohol
if they "could get pregnant." 393 Regulation of teratogenic
medications, which can be harmful in pregnancy, have triggered the
FDA to create aggressive safety measures that restrict prescriptions
given to "pre-pregnant" women of childbearing age. 39 4 For example,
Accutane, an acne medication that causes a significant risk of
miscarriage and birth defects, was at one point prescribed only after
the physician gave his female patient of childbearing age a
pregnancy test, then had her agree that she would either use two
methods of contraceptives or abstain from sexual activity entirely. 395

390. Every Student Succeeds Act, Pub. L. No. 114-95, 129 Stat. 1802 (2015), §
8542(a).
391. See Priscilla J. Smith, Contraceptive Comstockery: Reasoning from
Immorality to Illness in the Twenty-First Century, 47 CONN. L. REV. 971, 994 (2015).
392. Alcohol and Pregnancy, supra note 2. See also Cat Ferguson, CDC Keeps
Quietly Changing that Booze and Pregnancy Infographic, BUZZFEED (Feb. 11, 2016,
12:52 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/catferguson/the-brief-and-wonderous-life-of-acdc-infographic; Olga Khazan & Julie Beck, Protect Your Womb from the Devil Drink,
THE
ATIANTIC
(Feb.
3,
2016),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive
/2016/02/protect-your-womb-from-the-devil-drink/459813/.
393. Id.
394. Lars Noah, Too High A Price for Some Drugs?: The FDA Burdens
Reproductive Choice, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 231, 233 (2007).
395. Id. at 235.
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Many women, however, are seen as undesirable mothers and are
legally pressured or forced not to have children at all. One charity
program even pays one category of undesirables-women with a
history of drug addiction-to secure long-term contraceptives,
including a payment of $300 if they undergo sterilization
procedures.3 96 Such women are more likely to be poor and non-white,
and any discussion of the rules of maternity must acknowledge that
39 7
large numbers of women are told not to be mothers at all.

A. PotentialMothers in Prison
Women sentenced to prison are perhaps the easiest group for
some to dismiss as "not suited to be mothers."3 98 Such an attitude
towards mothers in prison likely contributes to the phenomenon of
forcing women in jail to labor and give birth while physically
shackled. 399 Deborah Ahrens recently chronicled the many obstacles
that pregnant women in prison face, ranging from being recognized
as pregnant at all while incarcerated to receiving appropriate
medical care during pregnancy and labor.400
Another approach prevents women in prison from becoming
mothers at all. The Human Rights Program at Justice Now wrote in
2009 that "[a] person entering a women's prison in California in her
twenties faces a significant risk of leaving prison unable to have
children, whether because of a hysterectomy, because of inadequate
medical care, or because her prison sentence will outlast her
reproductive years." 401 The prevalence of sterilizations performed

396. See generally Bruce A. Thyer, Project Prevention: Concept, Operation,
Results and Controversies About Paying Drug Abusers to Obtain Long-Term Birth
Control, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 643 (2016) (discussing the methods of Project
Prevention); Janet Simmonds, Coercion in California: Eugenics Reconstituted in
Welfare Reform, the Contracting of Reproductive Capacity, and Terms of Probation,
17 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 269, 282 (2006).
397. See, e.g., Cherry, supra note 1, at 106-17; No MAs BEBtS (NO MORE
BABIES) (ITVS 2015), (chronicling story of ten Mexican women sterilized during
emergency c-sections in Los Angeles in the 1970's).

398. Robin Levi et al., Creating the "Bad Mother": How the U.S. Approach to
Pregnancy in Prisons Violates the Right to Be A Mother, 18 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 3
(2010).

399.

See Priscilla A. Ocen, Punishing Pregnancy: Race, Incarceration, and the

Shackling of PregnantPrisoners, 100 CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1250-55 (2012).
400. See Ahrens, supra note 97, at 6.
401. Human Rights Program At Justice Now, PrisonsAs A Tool of Reproductive
Oppression, 5 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 309, 310 (2009).
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upon women in prisons is a disturbing message as to which women
should be allowed to become mothers.
In 2013, a report written by The Center for Investigative
Reporting uncovered a startling number-nearly 150-of tubal
ligations performed upon female inmates in just two California
prisons from 2006 to 2010.402 The procedures were performed in
violation of an approval process aimed at overseeing and minimizing
the circumstances in which sterilizations are performed, which was
itself instituted in response to a problematic history of sterilizing
women in jail without medical necessity or the women's consent. 40 3
The California State Auditor later investigated tubal ligations
performed in state prisons and found "systematic failures to secure
advance approval for the surgery and to document in women's files
that appropriate counseling had taken place." 40 4 Similarly, Justice
Now reported that it "heard anecdotally of many hysterectomies
performed under questionable circumstances-hysterectomies that
appear to occur disproportionately to people of color." 40 5
B. PotentialMothers on Probation
Sterilization and long-term birth control methods have also been
imposed as conditions of probation. As a general rule, conditions of
probation must be "reasonable" in two ways: first, the probation
condition must be reasonably related to the crime, rehabilitation, or
the safety of the public; second, the condition must be reasonable as
opposed to excessively punitive or harsh. 406 In 1967, a California
court rejected a probation condition that a woman convicted of
robbery not become pregnant until she was married on the logic that
a restriction on pregnancy was not reasonably related to the crime of
robbery. 407 A number of judges tried to impose such restrictions on
women convicted of child abuse in the 1970s, reasoning that a
reasonable relationship existed between the crime and the condition,

402. Rachel Roth & Sara L. Ainsworth, "IfThey Hand You A Paper, You Sign It":
A Call to End the Sterilization of Women in Prison, 26 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 7, 32
(2015).
403. Elizabeth J. Chen, Restoring Rights for Reproductive Justice, 22 AM. U. J.
GENDER Soc. POLY & L. 281, 296 (2014).
404. Roth & Ainsworth, supra note 398, at 35.
405. Human Rights Program At Justice Now, supra note 397, at 321.
406. See Janet F. Ginzberg, Compulsory Contraception As A Condition of
Probation:The Use and Abuse of Norplant, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 979, 990-91 (1992).
407. People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal.Rptr. 290, 293 (Ct. App. 1967).
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but were repeatedly rebuffed by appellate courts. 408 However, one
exception from this time period was a case in which the abuse in
question occurred during pregnancy, as a mother adhered to a strict
40
diet that caused harm to the developing fetus. 9
Nonetheless, courts continue to impose restrictions on having
children as conditions of probation. One wave of attempts arose
when Norplant was approved by the FDA in 1990.410 Norplant is a
small implant of contraceptive hormones placed under the skin of a
41
woman's upper arm that prevents pregnancy for up to five years. 1
The prospect of effortless prevention of pregnancy after a relatively
small medical procedure proved irresistible to state legislators, who
proposed more than two dozen laws at the state level requiring or
incentivizing implantation of Norplant for women on probation or
women receiving public benefits. 4 12 Even without authorizing
legislation, some creative judges began ordering women convicted-of
child abuse or neglect to have Norplant implanted as a condition of
their probation. 4 13 For example, less than a month after Norplant's
approval, a California superior court judge earned "instant
notoriety" when he required that a woman convicted of three counts
of child abuse to be implanted with Norplant for the duration of her
probation. 414 The woman initially accepted the condition, although a
subsequent appeal was rendered moot when she violated another
415
probation condition.
Other judges simply focus on preventing pregnancy as a
condition of probation, without specifying a method. In 2000,. a
Montana judge sentenced a woman convicted of using drugs during
her pregnancy to ten years in jail, but then suspended five on the
condition that she take birth control pills to prevent pregnancy for

408. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. State, 378 So.2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State v.
Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976). See also Ginzberg, supra note 402,
at 995.
409. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 359-60, 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984);
Ginzberg, supra note 406, at 995-96.
410. See Ginzberg, supra note 402, at 980.
411. Id.
412. Sarah Gill, Discrimination, Historical Abuse, and the New Norplant
Problem, 16 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 43, 45-46 (1994).
413. Id. at 46.
414. Ginzberg, supra note 402, at 979 n.1, 980.
415. Elaine E. Sutherland, ProcreativeFreedom and Convicted Criminals in the
United States and the United Kingdom: Is Child Welfare Becoming the New
Eugenics?, 82 OR. L. REV. 1033, 1058-59 (2003).
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the entire five years, as well as take pregnancy tests to verify that
she had not become pregnant. 416
Why do judges continue to impose such conditions when there is
precedent finding such restrictions unreasonable? One reason is that
the women subjected to such orders are generally low-income and
lack the resources to challenge their sentence. Another is that when
the options presented are avoid pregnancy or receive a longer prison
sentence, many women will rationally prefer the shorter time in jail,
particularly if they already have children from whom they will be
separated while incarcerated. For this reason, the number of cases
with such conditions is unclear-one scholar's review of the American
Law Reports found only eleven cases, but those were appeals from
orders. By contrast, when reviewing both cases and press reports,
she found examples of such probation conditions in twenty-one
states. 4 17
C. PotentialMothers on Welfare
Poor women are also subjected to control and limitation of their
reproductive capacities. As mentioned above, a number of states
proposed bills that would either require women receiving public
assistance to have Norplant implanted, or to provide financial
incentives for women who did.418 Although proposals for such direct
requirements were unsuccessful, some states made Norplant
available to women on Medicaid, an unusually permissive step
compared to the availability of other new contraceptive options.4 19
The rhetoric surrounding "welfare queens" 42 0 using up public
funds with irresponsible childbearing is still very much present in
civic life. A Louisiana state legislator suggested in 2008 that the
state pay $1,000 to any woman receiving public benefits who would

416.

Rachel Roth, "No New Babies?" Gender Inequality and Reproductive Control

in the Criminal Justice and Prison Systems, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY & L.
391, 392 (2004).
417. Id. at 406.
418. Gill, supra note 408, at 45. See Laurence C. Nolan, The Unconstitutional
ConditionsDoctrine and MandatingNorplant for Women on Welfare Discourse, 3 AM.
U. J. GENDER & L. 15, 17 (1994). See also Catherine Albiston, The Social Meaning of
the Norplant Condition: Constitutional Considerationsof Race, Class, and Gender, 9
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 11 (1994) ("The common thread among these various
programs is that they target poor women of color.").
419. Nolan, supra note 414, at 17.
420. See Michele Estrin Gilman, The Return of the Welfare Queen, 22 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POLY & L. 247, 256-66 (2014).
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agree to be medically sterilized. 42 1 A Republican party executive in
Arizona declared on his own radio show, "You put me in charge of
Medicaid, the first thing I'd do is get [female recipients] Norplant,
birth-control implants, or tubal ligations." 422
Such rhetoric relies on a belief that women receiving public
assistance do not, or will not, provide adequate care to their
children. As Carol Sanger summarized in the context of welfare
reform in the mid- 1990s:
Whatever developmental benefits were once thought to
accrue from a mother's presence at home have been
superseded by hopes of fostering a wage-labor work ethic in
the children of the poor. The mother's relationship to work
becomes the explanation for why children turn out the way
they do. Thus workfare is explicitly about separating
nonworking mothers from their children. 423
Where Sanger viewed workfare as removing bad mothers from
their existing children, modern proposals point towards preventing
such women from becoming mothers in the first place.
D. Free Range Redux: Not if You're Poor
The previous section discussed mothers who face child neglect
allegations for allowing their children more independence than
dominant social mores. Such "free range" mothers tend to be middle
or upper class - the modern debate was sparked, in part, by outrage
after Lenore Skenazy published a story in the New York Sun
describing how she let her nine year old son travel home alone from
Bloomingdale's. 424 Such mothers are unaccustomed to having the
state second-guess their parenting choices or interfere in their

421. Roth & Ainsworth, supra note 398, at 15.
422. See id. See also Sean Sullivan, Arizona GOP Official Resigns After
2014),
15,
(Sept.
POST
WASH.
Comments,
Controversial
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2014/09/15/arizona-gopofficial-resigns-after-controversial-comments/.
423. Carol Sanger, Separatingfrom Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 476-77
(1996).
424. Lenore Skenazy, Why I Let My 9-Year-Old Ride the Subway Alone, N.Y.
SUN (April 1, 2008), http://www.nysun.com/news/why-i-let-my-9-year-old-ridesubway-alone.

TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW

436

[Vol. 84.367

family life, and they often react to the appearance of child protective
services with outrage. 425
By contrast, lower-income mothers may similarly let their
children play or travel unattended, but the motivation is necessity
rather than parenting philosophy. In the absence of affordable and
reliable childcare, mothers are faced with leaving children
unsupervised or losing their job. This lack of support for working
mothers, and mothers who are looking for work, occasionally results
in painful dilemmas for mothers.
A series of such mothers have made headlines in the last few
years. In June 2015, Laura Browder had recently moved to Houston
with her two children, two and six years old. 4 2 6 She was offered a job
interview held at a food court in a nearby mall. 4 2 7 She could not
secure childcare for her children, so she brought them with her to
the food court, bought them some food, then met with her
interviewer at another table. 428 She said she was never more than

thirty feet from her children and kept them in her line of sight the
entire time. 429 Her interview went well, and she was offered and
accepted the job.430 She then returned to her children and was
arrested, as a bystander had seen the children sitting alone and
called the police. 43 1
The summer before, Debra Harrell could not get affordable
babysitting for her nine-year-old daughter while she was at work at
McDonald's. 432 At first Harrell brought her laptop, which could

425. St. George & Schulte, supra note 383 ("We were stunned and extremely
angry . . . . We are the parents. We are the ones who decide what's best for the
children.").
426. Mom Charged With Abandonment Said Kids Were Never Out of Sight,
KHOU.COM
(July 17,
2015,
11:00 PM),
http://www.khou.com/story/news
/1ocal/2015/07/17/houston-mom-charged-with-abandoning-children-during-jobinterview/30307379/.
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Play in the Park Unsupervised, REASON.COM (July 14, 2014, 9:10 AM),
http://reason.com/blog/2014107/14/mom-jailed-because-she-let-her-9-yearol#.bvjkvj:jrwB. Ann Cammett points out that full-time employees of McDonald's so
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connect to McDonald's free wireless internet, and the girl sat in the
restaurant using the internet while her mother worked. 433 But the
Harrell's home was broken into and the laptop stolen, and without
the computer her daughter was bored. 434 She asked Harrell if she
could instead spend the day at a popular park. 4 3 5 Harrell agreed,
and gave her daughter a cellphone so she could call her at work in
case of emergency. 436 On the third day she spent at the park, an
43 7
When she
adult asked Harrell's daughter where her mother was.
438
Harrell was then
answered at work, the adult called the police.
arrested for "unlawful conduct toward a child," a felony with a
possible ten-year jail sentence, and her daughter was taken into the
custody of the Department of Social Services. 439 After Harrell was
arrested, a video of her interrogation was shown on a local news
station." 0 The police officer made clear his opinion of Harrell's
parenting skills:
OFFICER: You're her mother, right?
HARRELL: Yes sir.
OFFICER: You understand that you're in charge of her well
being?
HARRELL: Yes sir.
OFFICER: It's not other people's job to do so.441
Four months before, Shanesha Taylor of Phoenix was in dire
straits.44 2 Her monthly income, including food stamps, was $1,232,
but her monthly expenses totaled $1,274.443 She and her three
children-nine years old, two years old, and six months old-had lost
433. Skenazy, Mom Jailed Because She Let Her 9-Year-Old DaughterPlay in the
Park Unsupervised, supra note 393.
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their home, and alternated staying with friends and sleeping in her
car.44 She had been offered a job interview for a position she
believed would solve her financial problems, and had arranged to
leave her two younger children with a babysitter, but when she went
to drop the children off no one answered the door.44 5 Desperate not to
cancel the interview, she took the children with her to the interview
and left them in the car.44 6 It was a 71 degree day, and she left the
car windows partially down with the fan running.4 47 After she
finished her interview, she returned to the car to find her children
unharmed alongside the police, who arrested her.4 48

Taylor's mug shot, with tears streaming down her face, attracted
significant attention on the internet. 449 Readers created a meme
comparing her photograph with another Arizona mother, Catalina
Clouser, who while high on marijuana, placed her two month old
baby in its carseat on the roof of her car, then got in the car and
drove twelve miles. 450 (The baby was found uninjured in the carseat
in the middle of the freeway Clouser drove down.) 451 Clouser, who is
white, pleaded guilty to child abuse and driving under the influence
of marijuana, and was sentenced to sixteen years' probation. 452
Taylor, who is black, was initially charged with two felony counts of
child abuse. 453 The meme juxtaposed the two women's mug shots,
labeling Taylor (whose trial was not concluded) with "jail and
children taken away," versus Clouser's "probation."454 The meme,
although inaccurate when it was made, expressed outrage at the
perceived different treatment of the two women. 455 Ultimately,
further public outcry was forestalled. After protracted negotiations
with the prosecutor, Taylor eventually pleaded guilty to one count of
child abuse, was required to complete parenting classes and classes
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on domestic violence, and was put on probation for eighteen years. 456
Taylor avoided jail time, but was subjected to both legal and societal
scrutiny.
In a perfect world, Browder, Harrell, and Taylor would have had
babysitting or other childcare arrangements for their children. But
in the absence of affordable and available childcare, such mothers
are forced to weigh the relative harms of leaving their children
unsupervised and being unable to provide for them. Chris Gottlieb
sympathetically outlined the dilemma faced by such mothers:
The parent who "chose" to leave her ten-year-old alone
while she went to work is deemed to have such bad
parenting judgment that she may not be trusted to keep her
child safe under any circumstances. Of course, a mother
who leaves a child home because otherwise she will lose her
job and means of supporting that child was choosing
between two bad options. She may have made the wrong
decision (though, of course, this is one of the many
parenting questions on which contradictory views are held),
but she may be an excellent parent. She certainly is a
parent who could be given better options. 457
The lives of low and no-income mothers are much more public
than well-off mothers. They lack the private spaces afforded by
single-family homes. Their parenting choices are thus more exposed
to public and legal judgment, resulting in what one commentator
called "somewhat arbitrary judgment calls" by police and child
protective services: "They wouldn't think of preventing many
statistically riskier parenting decisions so long as those decisions
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jive comfortably with social norms." 4 58 For those "undesirable"
mothers who struggle to provide for their children, their
circumstances combine to make them both financially and legally
vulnerable.
CONCLUSION

This article presents an incomplete listing of all the myriad ways
in which mothers are restricted and punished by the law. This is not
to say that all regulation of parents is problematic or should be
eliminated. A central inquiry in feminist legal theory, however, is to
identify ways in which the law disadvantages women, and this
article's survey of the various areas of law and resulting impacts
upon a mother's life demonstrates how seemingly minor restrictions
across so many topics adds up to significant regulation and coercion,
with the full power of the state behind it.459 The institutional
motherhood Robin West referred to in 1988 has become a regulated
and policed motherhood, corralled from all sides into an ideal of
mothering that may not exist in reality. 460
This institutional motherhood has not been envisioned by a
centralized source of power intent on dominating women. 461 The
restrictions discussed above arise from an unspoken but deeplyrooted general skepticism or distrust of women's autonomy and
decision making capacities. The status of motherhood at present is to
be subordinated to paternalistic assessments of what is best for
children. This subordination takes place through a thousand small
cuts. Each individual legal restriction is quite different, and arises
from varying concerns and via disparate entities. For example,
concern for the healthy delivery of a fetus, often framed as state
interest in "potential" life, has been most strongly articulated in the
context of abortion. Statutes specifying that pregnant women should
be kept on life support in order to bring the pregnancy to term are
often drafted and supported by pro-life activists who seek to protect
the life of the unborn. Such activists, however, are not the driving

458. Conor Friedersdorf, Working Mom Arrested for Letting Her 9-Year-Old Play
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force behind failure to protect laws, or application of child neglect
statutes against free range mothers, or tubal ligations performed on
women without their meaningful consent. Much of the regulation
arises in response to extreme examples of harms inflicted upon
children - and while the motivation and sympathy in the individual
case is entirely understandable, the broader rule is later applied to
harder and more attenuated examples.
Thus, the first lesson from the rules of maternity may be a
difficult one. Legislators, regulators, judges, and prosecutors must
consciously take a step back from the laudable instinct to protect
children and promote their well-being. However, counterintuitive it
may seem, it is necessary to reassess the role of legal regulation in
order to fully respect the agency of mothers. Autonomy "depends on
social conditions that allow for its exercise," and as chronicled in this
article, the legal restrictions surrounding motherhood at present
constrict autonomy severely. 462 Instead, regulation of motherhood
should shift in order to allow greater variety in parenting choices,
accepting that there is a swathe of gray between good mother and
bad mother encompasses perfectly acceptable parenting choices.463
The obvious objection to lessening regulation of parenting is that
some legal regulation is still appropriate, and this article does not
suggest that all legal regulation of parenting is suspect and should
be amended. Instead, regulation should use as a starting point the
parameters of the Troxel presumption: that so long as a mother is a
fit parent, the law should presume that she acts in the best interest
of her child and trust those choices, even though they might not be
what an individual regulator believes is ideal. 464
This will benefit not only the mother, who will receive the
respect and deference that she deserves as a competent parent, but
also the child. Any interference in a mother/child relationship, no
matter how well-intentioned, harms the value of the child's
individual and irreplaceable link to her mother. 465 This relationship
is not only important at an emotional and psychological level, but
also in teaching children themselves to become autonomous
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adults.4 6 6 Part of modeling autonomy for children is demonstrating
the value of plurality. The variety in parenting choices and
philosophies that children observe growing up teaches them that
they live in a pluralistic society, and that diversity within reasonable
boundaries is a strength of their community.4 67
Reasonable boundaries, moreover, can be indicated through a
rewriting of the rules of maternity. Again, Troxel points the way:
lawmakers and enforcers should presume that a fit parent is acting
in her child's best interest.4 6 8 This is not to say that the only
circumstances justifying state intervention in any manner should be
events that give rise to a child maltreatment proceeding. Instead, a
broader principle should arise that defers to parental judgment if the
issue does not implicate a reasonably direct threat to the safety of
children. Policymakers should attempt to draw a line between issues
with potentially dangerous consequences and issues of best practices
or optimal care.
Examples on either end of the extreme illustrate the difference.
Questions with potentially dangerous consequences include
regulations of explicit safety concern, such as car seats for infants
and vaccine requirements. Issues that merely implicate the best care
for children include the decision to breastfeed or use formula. In
such circumstances, any legal regulation affecting the decision of
what to feed one's child should aim to support whatever choice an
individual mother makes-justifying both further accommodations
of mothers who work outside the home and wish to continue
breastfeeding, and making formula available to low-income mothers
who cannot or choose not to breastfeed through the WIC program,
without penalizing them by denying them other food vouchers. Both
choices are legitimate,
and neither implicates
dangerous
consequences for children.
Obviously, this leaves considerable gray area in the middle, and
potentially dangerous consequences can be defined to arguably
include matters this article would leave to parental discretion. Many
breastfeeding advocates argue, to be fair, that breastfeeding is safer
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for a child and improves that child's health.46 9 Identifying danger
may be an imprecise standard in some ways, but it at least nudges
the line of acceptable state intervention outwards a bit, leaving more
parental choices left to the individual mother.
Additionally, an assessment of danger versus optimal choices
must be accompanied by a principle of equal application, both
between mothers and between all parents. Two questions discussed
above easily qualify as issues with potentially dangerous
consequences: drug use during pregnancy and failure to protect a
child from abuse. Both are appropriate arenas for regulation, but
both are currently characterized by inconsistent application.
Although hospital staff must report positive drug tests, it is left to
individual hospitals to determine when or if a woman or baby's blood
is tested, and if so what result is positive versus negative. 470 Failure
to protect laws are virtually always used to prosecute mothers, even
though fathers are often liable as well.4 7 1 When state intervention is
justified, therefore, a firm principle should require every person
involved in creation and application of the mechanisms of
intervention to consider how to ensure equal application, from
drafting relevant statutes or other regulations to prosecutorial
discretion. Again, regulators must recognize that existing tendencies
have become too coercive and be willing to err on the side of
respecting a mother's autonomy and decisions. 472
Although a full explanation of policy alternatives to the rules of
maternity discussed above is beyond the scope of this article, guiding
principles and alternatives to the existing rules of maternity can be
briefly outlined. As first principles: Only intervene when justified by
potential danger. Interventions must be equally applied to all
parents. Err on the side of autonomy.
Instead of treating a mother's body as a child's vessel, Rule 1 of
maternity should be pregnancy does not erase bodily privacy.
Notwithstanding her relationship to the child, a mother's autonomy
and agency is most strongly implicated when it comes to decisions
about her own medical care and body. Barring the most extreme
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circumstances, decisions such as the method of childbirth should be
left up to the mother.
Rather than telling women that doctor knows best, pregnant
women should be empowered to choose their own medical care.
Physicians can and should provide information, but must leave the
ultimate decision to the individual patient. If a woman disagrees
with her doctor's recommendation, unless a doctor can prove nearunanimous consensus among medical professionals and potentially
dangerous consequences to rejecting that near-unanimous
recommendation, she should be free to direct her own care (or lack of
care).
While expecting parents in general to protect their children is an
appropriate goal, telling women that the "mother must always
protect" has been applied in a starkly gendered and insufficiently
contextualized way. Instead, parents protect, but sometimes need
protection too. Failure to protect statutes should not be applied
routinely, particularly when the mother who failed to protect is
vulnerable as a victim of domestic violence or an undocumented
immigrant. Given the one-sided application of such statutes,
legislators should consider narrowing them to apply only in
situations where a parent was present for the abuse, as opposed to
leaving a child in the care of an abuser. This is a particularly
difficult line to draw, as child abuse is undoubtedly the serious
danger that the state is justified in trying to prevent, but however
well-intentioned failure to protect statutes have been, the
application has nonetheless been problematic.
Mothers-and parents-come in many different types, and good
mothers can take very different approaches to the same aspects of
raising children. They should not be told that "good motherhood is a
narrow road," but rather all parents deserve respect. A multitude of
individual variables play into questions like whether to breastfeed,
how long to breastfeed, how closely to supervise a child, or how to
best develop a child's independence and self-sufficiency. Although
free-range parents may arguably risk potential danger by letting a
child travel without supervision to school or a park, this is an area
where the Troxel line of parental fitness may be the best boundary
line to identify where the state may intervene.
Finally, instead of "only some women need apply," the state
should recognize that all women have agency, and every woman
chooses whether to become a mother. Every individual woman should
make decisions whether or not to have children free of any coercion
by the state. To the extent that the state regulates mothers who
belong to traditionally disadvantaged groups, the regulation should
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seek to support each woman's individual decisions. Poor mothers
should not have to choose between work and childcare. The most
effective way of supporting their choices is by making employment
viable through reliable and affordable childcare, rather than
punishing mothers who have been forced to attempt to balance both
at once.
Such revisions to the rules of maternity may seem unattainable.
It is natural for representatives of the state, and society at large, to
form educated and reasonable opinions about the best parenting
practices, and it may seem counterproductive not to strongly
encourage the best choices for all children. But recognizing the
importance of relationships and obligations arising from those
relationships should not eliminate women's autonomy entirely.
Without thoughtful examination and modification, the rules of
maternity threaten to limit women's choices even more narrowly
with each new danger identified or bit of data developed about how
to be the best mother. The rules must be rewritten to support
mothers as individuals with agency, so that they raise autonomous
children who may, under circumstances of their own choosing,
become mothers themselves.

